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This literature review is part of a larger work program being managed jointly by the Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care (the Commission) and the Independent Hospital 
Pricing Authority (IHPA).  The purpose of this literature review is to review the evidence on existing 
mechanisms in operation which aim to integrate quality and safety into the pricing or funding 
arrangements for health care.  This literature review will also inform a consultation paper that will 
explore the options the IHPA and the Commission may recommend to its boards for including 
quality and safety in its future iterations of the Pricing Framework for Australian Public Hospital 
Services.  The focus of both this literature review and the subsequent consultation paper is on 
quality and safety in relation to pricing and not on quality and safety per se. 
 
Given the limited time frame for this project, a rapid but rigorous search strategy (consistent with 
the conduct of systematic reviews) was used to identify literature related to integrating quality and 
safety into healthcare pricing or funding systems.  The literature search included both peer reviewed 
Australian and international academic literature as well as material outside the academic literature 
such as government reports and web based information.  It was limited to publications in English 
that could be accessed in the limited time frame. 
 
Four overarching models are considered in this literature review.  These are: 
 
 Best practice pricing  – i.e. evidenced based decisions on what constitutes “best practice” for 
treatment of a particular condition, then applying a price to the provision of this best practice 
package of service or model of care 
 Normative pricing - i.e. use of price to influence the delivery of care (e.g. provide more in-home 
care for certain conditions) 
 Quality structures pricing models – e.g. linkage of the accreditation standards to funding in the 
private hospital system 
 Payment for Performance (P4P) or Safety and Quality pricing - i.e. linkage of quality, safety 
and funding through the imposition of financial incentives and / or disincentives for certain 
behaviours or outcomes  
In addition the use of information on performance (including casemix data) to drive safety and 
quality will also be considered. 
 
There is a rich literature arguing the case that health care pricing models should reward quality 
and safety.  Many of the arguments in this literature may be perceived as inherently appealing.  
However, while strong on argument, it was found that most of the literature is weak on evidence. 
 
There is currently limited evaluation or published research data to support Best Practice Pricing. 
The few research studies report modest gains or a beset with methodological inadequacies 
(Casale et al., 2007; Kuo et al., 2011; Nahra et al., 2006).  The most major scheme is the 
introduction of Best Practice Tariffs in England.  Some initial findings from the National Hip 
Fracture Database in the UK (National Hip Fracture Database, 2012) show some improvements 
but there needs to be conclusive evidence that this approach is actually delivering meaningful 
gains in both safety and quality and that the scheme represents value for money in comparison to 
other potential incentive initiatives. 
 
There is limited published data concerning the Normative pricing approaches.  The use of 
normative approach by the National Health Service (UK) to incentivise day surgery procedures is 
yet to be evaluated.  Queensland Health is proposing to introduce a similar strategy in 2012-2013 
(Steele and Wright, 2012) and there are a number of new US initiatives to reduce readmissions 
and to provide greater home based care but these are only at their initial stages and will need to 
be evaluated.  Some research studies examining normative approaches in the radiology area have 
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reported substantial improvements in performance (Andriole et al., 2010; Boland et al., 2010) 
although due to weaknesses in the research design the level of evidence is weak. 
 
With regard to Quality Pricing Structures the most common approaches are accreditation, clinical 
quality registries linked to clinical benchmarking and other quality/safety improvement activities 
and the funding approach involves paying for participation in such activities.  The most evidence 
for these approaches is to provide funding to allow clinical services to participate in clinical quality 
registries linked to clinical benchmarking (Birkmeyer and Birkmeyer, 2006; McNeil et al., 2010; 
Share et al., 2011).  The evidence for this approach is strong in terms of achieving improvements 
in quality and safety.  However, there is no direct evidence on the links between performance and 
the level of funding.  Powell et al. (2008) note the lack of studies concerning cost effectiveness 
although the more recent study by Share et al. (2011) reports impressive savings for a clinical 
collaborative in Michigan although the cost for the initiative was also high.  
 
With regard to incentive or pay-for performance schemes while there have been many research 
studies conducted on the Premier Hospital Quality lncentive Demonstration (PHQID) project in the 
USA there is no convincing evidence that demonstrates any beneficial outcomes that can be 
attributed to the program (Ryan 2009a; Jha et al., 2012).  The most recent study (Jha et al., 2012) 
is the most definitive.  It found no impact on patient outcomes for hospitals in the Premier pay-for-
performance program compared with non-Premier hospitals.  Thus, participation in the pay-for-
performance was not associated with a decline in mortality above and beyond those reported for 
hospitals that participated in public reporting alone.  No difference was found in outcomes even for 
conditions in which mortality rates were explicitly incentivised.   
 
The Advancing Quality Initiative in England (see page 50) shows greater evidence concerning the 
reduction in short-term in-hospital mortality and improvement in hospital quality scores (Sutton et 
al., 2011; 2012).  Some models implemented in other countries and locally also show some 
evidence but require more rigorous evaluation.   
 
However, given the state of the evidence, a review paper on incentive systems (Glasziou et al., 
2012) recently identified 9 key questions that need to be asked before the introduction of any 
incentive scheme designed to change clinician behaviour. These include: 
 
Part A: Is a financial incentive appropriate? 
 Does the desired clinical action improve patient outcomes? 
 Will undesirable clinical behaviour persist without intervention? 
 Are there valid, reliable and practical measures for the desired clinical behaviour? 
 Have the barriers and enablers to improving clinical behaviour been assessed? 
 Will financial incentives work, and better than other interventions to change 
behaviour, and why? 
 Will benefits clearly outweigh any unintended harmful effects, and at an acceptable 
cost? 
 
Part B: Implementation 
 Are systems and structures needed for the change in place? 
 How much should be paid to whom, and for how long? 
 How will the incentives be delivered? 
 
Appleby et al. (2012) indicate the same factors should be considered at a system level when 
considering the introduction of payment by results schemes.  Many of these issues apply equally 
well to the other models discussed, including the imposition of disincentives.  
 
Use of financial disincentives to drive quality/safety improvement appears to be gaining 
momentum.  However these models have only recently been implemented or are still in 
development stages and there is currently little evidence regarding the outcomes of this approach 
(refer Section 7.9).  While some conditions, such as those on ‘never lists’, can definitely be 
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‘hospital acquired’ can be difficult (Fuller et al., 2011).  Therefore, the complexities of classifying 
conditions as ‘hospital acquired’ is a significant consideration of a model that penalises for hospital 
acquired conditions. 
 
Information on performance (including casemix data) can be used to drive quality and safety.  
Sutherland et al. (2011) report that some empirical work in Australia by Sharma (2007) suggests 
ABF may encourage hospitals to provide higher quality of care to reduce costly complications or 
readmissions.  Implementation of ABF has also been associated with increased efforts to monitor 
hospital quality (Duckett, 1995; Ettelt et al., 2006) and the clinical and administrative data used to 
support ABF are being used for hospital quality improvement initiatives (McNair et al., 2009; 
Iezzoni 2009; Hagen et al., 2006).   
 
An examination of the effects of the introduction of Activity Based Funding indicates there has 
been no reduction in hospital quality of care associated with ABF implementation (Sutherland, 
2011).  The incentives under ABF are for hospitals to decrease lengths of stay, increase volume 
and reduce cost but it is important that these gains are not made at the cost of a reduction in 
quality of care (Sutherland, 2011).  There is little evidence for a decline in the quality or safety of 
care associated with the introduction of ABF with studies indicating mortality remains much the 
same or is slightly lower (Forgione et al., 2005; Louis et al., 1999; Moreno-Serra and Wagstaff, 
2009).  Readmission rates remain similar and hospital quality indicators have also shown no 
decline (Farrar et al., 2009; Jencks et al., 2009; Kahn et al., 1990; Kahn et al., 1993).   
 
However, overall, it is noted that much of the current research literature reviewed reflects poor 
research designs with inadequate controls making attribution of the effects uncertain.  The 
conclusion is that there is insufficient international evidence at present to support the ‘off the shelf’ 
adoption of any existing pricing model that incorporates financial incentives and/or sanctions for 
quality and safety.   
 
The literature review provides evidence that a range of factors need to be considered in the 
implementation of any pilot scheme or field trial.  These, in summary, are: 
 
 Incentives need to be substantial if the model is to have any effect (Jha et al., 2012) 
 Incentives need to be delivered to the level of the clinical department to have any effect 
(Glasziou et al., 2012; Jha et al., 2012; Ryan 2009; Stockwell, 2010; Sutton et al., 2011; 2012) 
 The impact of any proposed model needs to be modelled and carefully evaluated both prior to 
and at regular intervals during implementation 
 The impact analysis should include consideration of the potential for regional disparities, as 
there is some evidence in the literature that some payment for performance models have 
disadvantaged rural hospitals (Stockwell, 2010) 
 Incentive structures need to focus on engendering improvement across all hospitals rather 
than just rewarding hospitals/services that are already performing well (Karve et al., 2008; 
Nicholas et al., 2011; Ryan 2009, Ryan et al., 2012; Van Herck et al., 2010) 
 Potential perverse incentives need to be carefully considered (Sutherland, 2012; Glasziou et 
al., 2012) and 
 Methodologies for risk adjustment need to be developed and incorporated (Sutherland 2012; 
Birkemeyer and Birkemeyer 2006; Ryan 2009; Ryan et al 2012) 
 
These findings have important implications in the Australian context.  The Independent Hospital 
Pricing Authority (IHPA) is determining the price that the Commonwealth pays Local Health 
Networks for the Commonwealth contribution to public hospital funding.  The Commonwealth 
contribution is approximately 40% of public hospital funding and any incentive that the IHPA might 
build into the model would impact only on the Commonwealth contribution.   
 
Further, the Commonwealth funding is directed to Local Health Networks (regional health 
authorities) rather than to specific hospitals or to clinical departments within hospitals.  Based on 
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the evidence in the international literature (Jha et al., 2012; Ryan 2009; Sutton et al., 2011; 2012; 
Stockwell, 2010), it is unlikely that incentives built into the model at this level would work unless 
there was agreement for these incentives to flow down to the level of the clinical department. 
 
Finally, the focus on traditional hospital activity (largely inpatient medicine and surgery) in P4P 
models has important implications in relation to allocative efficiency and in terms of incentives to 
develop new models of care.  ‘Best practice’ and ‘normative’ pricing models are better than P4P in 
creating incentives for new models of care but, like P4P, most reported models are currently 
narrow in scope (refer Sections 4.5 and 5.7).   
 
However, despite the limited evidence base, the concept of shifting the focus from cost to value for 
money may be perceived as inherently appealing and the idea of linking funding to quality and 
safety will continue to attract the interest of many stakeholders including consumers, clinicians and 
system managers.  Accordingly, it is important that Australia learns the lessons of the international 
experience in considering how to progress this issue in the future. 
 
In doing so, it is important to note that the strongest evidence overall on how to genuinely improve 
quality and safety exists for clinical quality registry and benchmarking systems (see page 30) and 
these systems typically have no evidence that examines links to funding at all.  Instead, clinical 
quality registry and benchmarking systems use clinical registry data to compare the performance 
of providers, to identify best practice and to drive improvements in quality and patient outcomes.  
The evidence base for these models is stronger than for any reported funding model. 
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1 Introduction  
This literature review is part of a larger work program being managed jointly by the Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality (the Commission) and the Independent Hospital Pricing 
Authority (IHPA).  The purpose of this literature review is to review the evidence on existing 
mechanisms in operation which aim to integrate quality and safety into the pricing or funding 
arrangements for health care.  This literature review will also inform a consultation paper that will 
explore the options the IHPA and the Commission may recommend to its boards for including 
quality and safety in its future iterations of the Pricing Framework for Australian Public Hospital 
Services.  The focus of both this literature review and the subsequent consultation paper is on 
quality and safety in relation to pricing and not on quality on safety per se. 
 
The National Efficient Price (NEP) is now being used to determine the Commonwealth contribution 
to public hospital funding.  The Commonwealth contribution represents approximately 40% of 
public hospital funding although the actual percentage varies by jurisdiction and by the proportion 
of public patients in each hospital.   
 
The Commission and the IHPA have together established a Joint Working Party - Safety and 
Quality.  The IHPA had already begun investigations of these issues including the commissioning 
of a broader literature review, of which quality and safety was only one small component (Health 
Policy Solutions, Casemix Consulting and Aspex Consulting 2012).  The IHPA’s first pricing 
determination did not incorporate adjustments for quality and safety but noted that further work 
would be required over time on this issue.  This literature review forms an important part of that 
additional work. 
 
Four overarching models are considered in this literature review.  In best practice pricing, the price 
is based on a “best practice package of service or model of care”.  These packages are typically 
based on clinical pathways that are developed using both empirical evidence and expert opinion.  
Under this model, a standard price is set for the care that is specified in the pathway.  The 
pathway itself is typically defined for a casemix class.  The price can be prospectively determined 
and may be paid regardless of whether the care for any specific patient is actually provided in 
accordance with the pathway.  Alternatively, the standard price may be set (usually reflecting 
average national cost) and the additional incentive is paid once all, or a percent (e.g. 80-90%), of 
best practice criteria have been shown to be met.  In practice, such pathways exist only for a 
limited range of conditions and this is an important limitation when considering such a funding 
model.   
 
Normative pricing, whereby the price is used to influence the delivery of care, also uses 
prospectively determined pricing.  The goal is to provide incentives to deliver care that is defined 
as being inherently desirable and to create disincentives to deliver inappropriate care.  Thus, for 
example, the price for a normal obstetric delivery can be set to make such deliveries slightly 
“profitable” while the price for an elective caesarean section can be set to make such deliveries 
slightly “unprofitable”.  In normative pricing the unit of purchase is again the casemix class and the 
price is often determined prospectively although in some cases a retrospective adjustment may be 
made for performance against the target.  Normative pricing can also be used to create incentives 
to deliver care in alternate settings including outpatients and home care.  The difference to BPP is 
that it incentivises particular activities (e.g. increase day surgery rates, reduce emergency 
department waiting times, reduce radiology turn around times) rather than it being tied to a 
detailed set of best practice guidelines developed for a particular disease.  In practice, normative 
pricing can only be used when there is agreement about what constitutes desirable and 
undesirable care. 
 
The third alternative for prospective pricing is to link pricing to structural approaches to quality and 
safety such as linking funding to accreditation or to participation in benchmarking activities.  Under 
this approach, for example, accredited hospitals would be funded at a higher rate than non-
accredited hospitals.  In practice, most of these systems measure processes as proxies for patient 
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outcome rather than measuring patient outcomes directly and assume that good processes 
automatically result in good outcomes (Sutherland et al., 2011). 
 
The final alternative is Paying for Performance (P4P) or “safety and quality pricing”. P4P aims to 
create a direct link between quality and safety on the one hand and funding on the other.  Under 
these models good patient outcomes can be rewarded and / or poor patient outcomes can be 
penalised.  As per the third prospective approach outlined above, the intention is to create 
incentives for good quality and disincentives for poor quality.  The difference is that, in P4P, the 
price is adjusted retrospectively depending on the outcomes actually achieved for an individual 
patient.  For example, an episode of care during which an adverse event occurs might be funded 
at a lower rate than a normal or unremarkable episode.  
 
In practice, the concept of P4P or safety and quality pricing is inherently complicated from a 
technical perspective.  In particular if the pricing model does not include risk-adjustment, it may 
create incentives to care for only low risk patients and to deny care to higher risk patients.  
Imagine the case of a rehabilitation unit that receives two patient referrals on the one day and only 
has one bed available.  Patient A, despite having no risk factors, has experienced a stroke.  
Patient B is overweight and a heavy smoker and has also experienced a stroke.  If the 
rehabilitation service will receive bonus payments for good outcomes and financial sanctions for 
poor outcomes, what incentive would they have to accept Patient B?  While the intention of a P4P 
model is to provide incentives for good quality care, this example illustrates that it may also create 
incentives to select healthier (‘easier’) patients. 
 
Further it is often technically complex to determine the onset of a particular health condition (Fuller 
et al., 2011; Provonost et al., 2008; Zhan et al., 2007).  For example, take the case of a patient 
who develops an infection on day two of a hospital admission.  Such an infection could have been 
‘brewing’ prior to the admission.  Equally the patient may have developed the infection in the 48 
hours since admission.  Recent work undertaken by the National Casemix and Classification 
Centre in relation to the revision of the Condition Onset Flag (COF) definitions is testimony to the 
technical complexity of these issues (AIHW, 2012). 
 
In considering each of these four options, it is important to take account of the level at which the 
funding model actually works, as the context in which funding models operate is critical.  The 
Independent Hospital Pricing Authority (IHPA) is determining a global price for a total quantum of 
activity delivered by a local health network or similar.  It is not pricing the care of an individual 
patient, a specific clinical department or even an individual hospital.  It is also not determining the 
payments made to individual clinicians. 
 
The level at which the funding flows is critical because it directly influences whether any intended 
consequences are likely to be achieved.  For example, P4P or safety and quality pricing would 
only have an impact if the local health network decided to use the same funding model to fund its 
individual hospitals or clinical units within individual hospitals.  Even then, there is not a lot of 
evidence to suggest that hospital clinicians respond to such incentives when dealing with 
individual patients (Glasziou et al., 2012).  This is in contrast to some evidence that exists in 
relation to fee-for-service medicine which suggests that pricing can affect some aspects of clinical 
practice at the level of the individual (Flodgren et al., 2011). 
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2 Methods 
Given the limited time frame for this project, a rapid but rigorous search strategy (consistent with 
the conduct of systematic reviews) was used to identify literature related to integrating quality and 
safety into healthcare pricing or funding systems (refer Appendix 1).  The literature search included 
both peer reviewed Australian and international academic literature as well as material outside the 
academic literature such as government reports and web based information.  It was limited to 
publications in English that could be accessed in the four week time frame. 
2.1 Electronic Database Searches 
The following strategies were applied to identify published literature:  
 Search of relevant bibliographic databases including Medline, Psychinfo, Cinahl, Scopus, 
EconLit and Cochrane Collaboration for original contributions and review papers; 
 Using “snowballing” techniques including scanning references, using Google Scholar to 
identify citations and searching by key authors in the field; 
 Communication with authors of relevant studies and other experts in the field, especially those 
who have carried out in-depth studies or systematic analyses in the field;  
 Electronic searching of web based materials including identification of government studies, and 
reports, relevant review articles, and electronic citation searches including ISI web of 
knowledge. 
Initial search terms included such elements as efficient pricing and hospital quality and safety, the 
integration of quality and safety into healthcare funding and pricing systems, activity based funding 
and pricing models (best practice, normative, structural/accreditation and safety and quality pricing 
models including pay for performance), funding incentives and hospital pricing, health funding 
reform.  These search strategies were refined and elaborated during the course of the project. 
Where peer-reviewed research evidence was available, the literature review included a summary 
of the key features of each study (e.g. research purpose, design, methods, findings and any 
identified problems with the study). 
2.2 Identification of other published literature (non peer reviewed material)  
Strategies for obtaining relevant research from the ‘grey’ or practice literature via the internet 
included the searching of grey literature electronic databases including the searching of relevant 
State and National Health Department sites, relevant health quality and safety conference sites, 
international health care and evidence based health care sites and Australian organisations 
concerned with patient safety and quality and health services research.  
 Reports and articles available on the world wide web were searched through search engines;  
 Authors who presented abstracts on topics during national and international conferences were 
contacted (where possible) to obtain information on their initiatives; 
 Jurisdictional experts involved in the development and implementation of quality and safety 
related activity based funding initiatives were contacted where possible.  This included writing 
to relevant contacts in each jurisdiction to request the provision of any relevant material.    
For material relevant to the topic that was not peer-reviewed research, the literature review 
included a brief summary of information relevant to the key issues and questions of interest.  
2.3 Inclusion and exclusion criteria  
The scope of the review included Australian and international published literature regarding 
integrating quality and safety into healthcare pricing/funding systems.  The cut off date for 
electronic searches was early October although a couple of articles that came to our attention after 
that time and have been incorporated. 
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Material from the last ten years was of primary interest to the literature review.  However, where 
information from earlier literature was identified as relevant, this was pursued as necessary.  
Although there is an extensive literature relating to normative models for encouraging best practice 
at the individual practitioner level in the primary care sector (e.g. GP payments in UK – paying for 
immunisation) this literature was excluded as the literature review focused on system level 
initiatives related to hospital pricing.  However, if particular elements of a model were identified 
that may have been of particular significance in a broader context, they were included in the 
review.  
Following the searches two staff independently rated the abstracts obtained as to their relevance 
to the research question (highly relevant/ relevant/ marginally relevant and not relevant).Where 
there was disagreement between staff on their ratings these abstracts were double checked and 
the reference obtained for further assessment as necessary. All articles with a rating of marginally 
relevant or above were retrieved.  
An extensive bibliography is included in this report (see page 77). This includes many papers that 
were reviewed but not included in the body of the report.  Papers were not included in the body of 
the report if they dealt only with quality/safety or funding (and not both).  Papers were only 
included if they addressed the specific issue of the relationship between quality/safety and funding.   
2.4 Review summaries 
The literature was reviewed and classified based on various criteria as set out below.  
 
Country of origin 
 
1. Australia  





7. Other (specify) 
 
Area of focus  
 
1. Acute care 
2. Sub-acute care 
3. Mental health care 
4. Emergency care 
5. Ambulatory care 
6. Other (specify) 
 
Strength of evidence 
 
1. Well-supported practice – evaluated with a controlled trial (including cluster control) and 
reported in a peer-reviewed publication 
2. Supported practice – evaluated with a controlled trial group and reported in a government 
report or similar 
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4. Acceptable practice – evaluated with an independent assessment of outcomes, but no 
comparison group (e.g., pre- and post- comparisons, post-reporting only or qualitative methods 
only)  
5. Emerging practice – evaluated without an independent assessment of outcomes (e.g., 
formative evaluation, qualitative evaluation conducted internally) 
6. Routine practice (e.g., analysis of routine data) 
7. Expert opinion (e.g., peak bodies, government policy, individual opinion pieces) 
 
Level of health system 
 
Each paper was classified according to the level of the health system that is being funded using 
the model being reported: 
 
1. Funding goes to state/territory or similar 
2. Funding goes to Local Health Network or similar 
3. Funding goes to hospital or similar 
4. Funding goes to clinical stream, speciality or department within hospital 





2. Private not for profit  
3. Private for profit 
 
Significance of impact/effect(s) 
 
Is there evidence in the article of any actual improvements (positive) or unintended (negative) 
impacts or effects on quality and/or safety? 
1. Conclusive – positive/negative 
2. Inconclusive 
3. No 
4. Not applicable 
 





4. Not applicable 
 
Is there evidence of service/system change? 
 
1. Yes, short term 
2. Yes, long term 
3. No 
4. Not applicable 
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2. Yes, with caveat/s (e.g. incidental lessons learnt - with public reporting) 
3. No 
 
These features have been combined to produce five summary tables for each of the four models 
(or parts thereof).  The tables incorporate additional features such as key points, the type of 
funding mechanism, the measures of quality/safety and the context and setting.  These are 
outlined below: 
 
Summary Table 1 Details 
 
Article name Authors Date  Medium Model Funding 
mechanism  
Country of origin 
Summary Table 2 Focus and context 
Article name Area of focus Context and setting Magnitude of the incentive 
Summary Table 3 Results 







Summary Table 4 Key points 
Article name Key points from article Impact Significance of 
impact / effects 
Self-reported strength of any 
reported improvement 
Summary Table 5 Evidence and applicability 
Article name Evidence of 
service/system change 
Comments Overall applicability to Australia and 
to IHPA for ABF purposes 
All leading evidence-based articles, review papers and relevant government reports consulted 
have been included in these tables which provide a useful summary of the relevant information 
pertaining to each of the models.   
In addition to these, there is a significant literature outlining the personal opinion of many authors 
on the perceived advantages and/or disadvantages of linking pricing/funding to quality and safety.  
While some of these opinion pieces were reviewed as part of the current project, we limited the 
scope of the more systematic review to papers (both academic and practice) that purported to 
report on evidence rather than opinion. 
 
3 Models for Integrating Quality and Safety into Health Care Pricing 
Most of the models below which examine the integration of quality/safety into health care pricing 
are operating within the context of Activity Based Funding for hospitals.  Activity Based Funding 
(ABF) (or case-based funding) funds hospitals on the basis of the type and volume of services 
they provide as well as patient characteristics.  Diagnosis-related-groups (DRG) are used to 
classify and quantify hospital output and funding is tied to this.  Each DRG represents a group of 
clinically similar patients whose costs are expected to be similar and each hospitalisation is 
assigned to a single DRG based on the patient’s combination of procedures and diagnoses 
(Sutherland, 2011).  Many countries have designed their own DRG system an example of which is 
the Australian AR-DRG system.  
 
Fetter (1991), the originator of DRGs, intended to stimulate utilisation review in hospitals to allow 
better review and management of costs and care outcomes.  There are economic incentives 
associated with ABF because efficient hospitals ‘pocket’ the difference between the payment 
amount and the hospital’s actual cost of production.  Sutherland et al. (2011) in a review of the 
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hospital stays, ABF was associated with increasing technical efficiency although the reduction in 
cost per discharge but was not associated with aggregate cost savings to the health care system 
due to increasing volumes of patients treated. 
 
Appleby et al. (2012) note a number of adverse effects and limitations of ABF payment systems 
have been identified (increased hospital admissions, uncoordinated care across settings, under 
treatment, cost shifting, cherry picking and up-coding or misreporting).  Many of these have been 
addressed by policy responses, refinements of the payment system or by contractual controls (e.g. 
audit).  Appleby et al. (2012) note many countries are dissatisfied with the limitations of ABF for 
patients with chronic conditions and with multiple conditions and/or complex ongoing needs.  A 
number of countries (e.g. USA, UK) are experimenting with ‘bundling’ payments across the 
continuum of care (Appleby et al., 2012; Sutherland et al. 2011) to address these issues.  A 
number of these initiatives are reported in the sections below. 
 
With regard to quality/safety the incentives under ABF are for hospitals to decrease lengths of 
stay, increase volume and reduce cost but it is important that these gains are not made at the cost 
of a reduction in quality of care (Sutherland et al., 2011).  There is little evidence for a decline in 
the quality or safety of care associated with the introduction of ABF with studies indicating mortality 
remains much the same or is slightly lower (Forgione et al., 2005; Louis et al., 1999; Moreno-Serra 
and Wagstaff, 2009), readmission rates remain similar and hospital quality indicators have shown 
no decline (Farrar et al., 2009; Jencks et al., 2009; Kahn et al., 1990; Kahn et al., 1993).   
 
Sutherland et al. (2011) report that some empirical work in Australia by Sharma, (2007) suggests 
ABF may encourage hospitals to provide higher quality of care to reduce costly complications or 
readmissions.  Implementation of ABF has also been associated with increased efforts to monitor 
hospital quality (Duckett, 1995; Ettelt et al., 2006) and the clinical and administrative data used to 
support ABF are being used for hospital quality improvement initiatives (McNair et al., 2009; 
Iezzoni 2009; Hagen et al., 2006).  A study from Norway indicated that the introduction of ABF was 
associated with improved patient satisfaction due to reduction in waiting times (Hagen et al., 
2006). 
 
Although these studies indicate there has been no reduction in hospital quality of care associated 
with ABF implementation many countries (e.g. UK, USA, Australia etc.) using ABF systems have 
become increasingly interested in trying further approaches that may stimulate quality and safety 
improvements in hospital care. 
 
Four pricing models to integrate quality and safety have been considered in this literature review.  
These are Best Practice Pricing, Normative Models, Quality Structure Models and Safety and 
Quality Pricing.  They are described in the sections below and the key initiatives and studies 
relating to these models are discussed. In practice the difference between some of these models 
is subtle, as for example between some pay for performance and best practice pricing studies.  
Some studies have mixed elements and therefore could fit in either model and in these cases the 
study has been allocated to the model that provides the closest fit. 
 
Health Policy Solutions et al. (2011) also considers Best Practice Pricing to be ‘normative’ in the 
sense that the incentives used, like Normative Pricing, are used to drive changes in the pattern of 
care.  However, Normative Pricing, although also based on information concerning the desirability 
of a pattern of care is usually set to incentivise, for example, higher rates of day surgery across a 
range of appropriate conditions.  Within any health system it is likely that there will be components 
that relate to a range of the pricing models.  For example the National Health Service (United 
Kingdom) includes components of Best Practice Pricing, Normative Pricing and Safety and Quality 
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4 Best Practice Pricing 
Best practice pricing models involve an evidence based decision on what constitutes best practice 
for a treatment for a particular condition and then applying a price to the provision of this best 
practice pathway.  The critical feature is that an evidence based best practice pathway is 
elaborated and payment is related to the adoption of the pathway rather than a diverse set of 
safety and quality indicators or relative hospital performance in relation to these.  Another 
difference to other models described in further sections of this report (e.g. safety and quality 
pricing or pay-for-performance schemes) is that the incentive is for following the pathway.  
Payments are made where it can be verified that care has been delivered in accordance with the 
pathway.  In contrast, many safety and quality pricing / pay for performance schemes only reward 
those hospitals that are performing in the top percentiles in what is often described as 
‘tournament-based pay’. 
 
4.1 Best Practice Pricing (UK) 
The National Health Service in England (Dept. Health 2011) has applied best practice tariffs 
(BPTs) for casemix payments for a range of conditions.  Activity Based Funding in England is 
known as Payment by Results (PbR).  It was initially phased in from 2004/5 to reduce waiting 
times, to increase activity and to increase financial discipline and transparency by NHS 
organisations (Appleby et al., 2012).  The currency unit is the Health Related Group (HRG).  A 
national fixed price or tariff for each HRG was established on the basis of the average level of 
costs for each HRG.  Some variation in what hospitals receive compensates for ‘unavoidable’ cost 
variations due to regional variations (pay and price) as calculated by the Market Forces Factor 
(Appleby et al, 2012).  A further adjustment was introduced to allow for the higher costs of services 
in specialist centres and has been refined over time (Appleby et al., 2012).  Over time the 
proportion of activity included has risen and now represents about 60% of an average hospital’s 
activity and comprises about 1,300 mandatory tariffs.  As Appleby et al. (2012) indicate the 
Department of Health further reduces all tariffs each year to reinforce the cost-reducing incentives 
of a tariff fixed at average cost to improve efficiency.  In order to reduce the risk that the reductions 
in tariffs would reduce the quality of care a number of changes have been made to explicitly 
promote quality of care.  These include the introduction of Best Practice Tariffs, withholding funds 
for ‘never events’ (refer Appendix 2) and the introduction of the Commissioning for Quality and 
Innovation (CQUIN) payment framework (See Section 7.4.2) if providers meet specified standards 
for a range of services.  
 
  The services areas selected for Best Practice Tariffs were based on the following criteria: 
 
 High impact (e.g. high volumes, significant variation in practice, or significant impact on 
outcomes) 
 A strong evidence base and clinical consensus on the characteristics of best practice. 
 
From 2010 prices for cholecystectomy (gall bladder removal), fragility hip fracture, cataracts and 
stroke are no longer funded based on the average cost.  Instead, providers are paid according to 
the costs of ‘excellent care’ (Dept. of Health, 2010).  A specific approach has been developed for 
each BPT, tailored to the clinical characteristics of best practice and the availability, quality and 
flow of data.  Annex F of the Payments by Results Guidance for 2010-11(Dept. Health, 2010) 
provides the supporting documentation and evidence for these best practice pathways and 
guidelines.  From 2011/2012 best practice tariffs are to be extended to adult renal dialysis, 
interventional radiology, transient ischaemic attack, paediatric diabetes and primary total hip and 
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As an example of a BPT, the fragility hip fracture BPT (Dept. Health, 2011) applies to a subset of 
patients aged over 60 admitted non-electively within the hip procedure for trauma Health Related 
Groups (HRGs)1 where the following clinical conditions are met:  
 
(a) Time to surgery within 36 hours from arrival in an emergency department, or time of 
diagnosis if an inpatient, to the start of anaesthesia  








(d) Assessed by a geriatrician
 
in the perioperative period (within 72 hours of admission)  
(e) Postoperative geriatrician-directed multi-professional rehabilitation team  
(f) Fracture prevention assessments (falls and bone health).  
 
As Scott et al. (2011) indicate, incentives are applied to national fixed tariffs (based on the average 
cost of care) for particular HRGs and are mandatory for all hospitals.  The previous national tariff 
has been replaced by a higher best practice tariff and a lower non best practice tariff.  An 
additional payment applies on top of the appropriate base tariff if all (or an agreed target, for 
example, 90%) of the best practice compliance criteria are met.   
 
In 2010-2011 the additional payment for fragility hip fracture was set at 455 pounds higher than the 
base tariff.  In 2011-2012 this additional payment was doubled to 890 pounds and the base tariff 
was reduced by the same amount to strengthen the incentives for the adoption of best practice.  
As Scott et al. (2011) state, initially there may be real gains in income for commissioners and 
providers undertaking best practice but over time the base tariff will be reduced in line with the 
efficiency gain achieved.  As the base tariff declines over time, this could also be viewed as a 
‘penalty for non performance’ for those that have not adopted or achieved the target for the best 
practice pathway. 
 
The BPTs are paid by commissioners to NHS trusts, NHS foundation trusts, independent sector 
extended choice networks and independent sector free choice network providers.  How the trusts 
devolve the additional funding to the actual clinical areas concerned is unclear. 
The payment by results (PbR) team has commissioned an evaluation of the 2010-2011 best 
practice tariffs (www.dh.gov.uk/health/2011/12/bpt-update/; Dept. Health, 2011) to inform future practice.  
Although currently scheduled for release, this publication is not yet available.  The National Hip 
Fracture Database (NHFD), however, has produced a recent report (NHFD, National Report 
2012).  This indicates that their have been improvements since 2009/2010 in the percentage of 
patients given a falls assessment (from 24% to 43%), and having a pre-operative assessment by 
an orthogeriatrician (57% to 69%).  More patients are also now discharged on bone protection 
medication (24% to 43%) and there is a lower rate for patient developing pressure ulcers (6% to 
3.7%).  More patients are also receiving surgery within 48 hours (from 75% to 83%) but in 2011 
the rate was 87% so this recent drop is viewed as disappointing.  Also the indicator relating to 
admission to the orthopaedic ward within 4 hours has dropped slightly (55% to 52%).  Appleby et 
al. (2012) suggest that some of this change might be attributed to the publication and audit of 
standards. 
Across the four quarters of 2011 57% to 71% of hospitals achieved the Best Practice Tariff and in 
2012 this ranged from 77% to 87% which reflects the increasing number of hospitals taking part. 
This would suggest that overall the BPT is producing some improvements in the quality of care 
although the degree of improvement varies by indicator. 
                                               
1 HRGs are the UK equivalent to Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) 
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Each year draft guidelines and guidelines for the forthcoming year are published (Dept. Health, 
2010) based on the review of operational findings for the previous period and these provide some 
details of the changes to the Best Practice Tariff system but do not comprise a formal or 
independent evaluation.  An example of an outcome of this review process is the recent increase 
in best practice tariffs for fragility hip fracture and stroke which might suggest that the incentive 
needed to be strengthened in an endeavour to obtain the required performance across the 
indicators. 
4.2 Participating Hospital Agreement (PHA) Incentive Program (US) 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) implemented a quality improvement incentive 
program for 85 participating Michigan hospitals as part of the Rewarding Results demonstration in 
the US.  It is known as the Participating Hospitals Agreement (PHA) Incentive Program and this 
pay for performance program provides direct incentives to hospitals to increase adherence to 
health care related guidelines for two cardiac conditions - acute myocardial infarction (AMI) and 
congestive heart failure (CHF).  It commenced in 2000 and was fully implemented in 2001 (Nahra 
et al., 2006; Reiter et al., 2006). 
 
Hospitals are evaluated on: 
 
a) Provision of aspirin orders at discharge for AMI 
b) The prescription of beta-adrenergic blockers at discharge for AMI 
c) The prescription of angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors at discharge for CHF 
 
Hospital performance is defined as the proportion of all eligible patients who receive a particular 
treatment. 
 
Incentive payments are calculated as a percentage add-on to a hospitals’ inpatient DRG 
reimbursements and the maximum possible was 2% in 2003 (Nahra et al., 2006).  By 2006 it had 
risen to 3-5% (BCBSM, 2006).  The actual add-on is determined by multiplying the maximum 
possible add-on by the individual hospital’s score.  To receive any incentive payment from 2002 
the hospital score had to reflect at least a threshold of the median performance level of all 
participating hospitals.  Prior to 2002 a tournament-based pay scheme was utilised. 
 
From 2004 (BCBSM, 2006) some changes were made to the scheme but the limited evaluation 
data pertains to the earlier stage of the scheme.  Under the revised 2006 BCBSM incentive 
program, hospitals can earn an incentive of 3% of their combined inpatient and outpatient 
operating payments in the first year, up to 4% in the second year and up to 5% in the third year.  
Each hospitals incentive score is now based on a composite score of quality, patient safety and 
health of its community.  From 2004 these components were weighted in forming the total score 
(quality 50%, safety 40%, health of community 10%) 
 
As the scheme has evolved it has included incentives and associated indicators for the treatment 
of pneumonia, use of medication safety practices, surgical infection protection and the appropriate 
utilisation of high cost/ high variation surgical procedures (BCBSM 2006; Scott et al., 2011) 
 
Nahra et al. (2006) undertook an evaluation of the costs of the incentive scheme and the 
improvements in compliance with heart condition care elements (see above) between 2000 and 
2003.  This study used a prospective observational design but had methodological weaknesses 
due to the lack of a control group and the absence of baseline data prior to the scheme’s 
implementation.  It used 2000 as their baseline year but at this time the hospitals were already 
enrolling in the scheme.  As Scott et al. (2011) also suggest, this means the measure of effect over 
time is likely to be biased as trends in performance may have occurred in the absence of the 
scheme.  Nahra et al. (2006) report that compared to 2000 data in 2003 the rate for appropriate 
use of aspirin had increased by 8%, use of beta-blockers by 12% and ACE inhibitors by 10%.  
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of the PHA program.  Four year incentive system costs were US$22,059,383 and these included 
system administration costs. 
 
Nahra et al. (2006) also examined the cost per Quality-Adjusted Life Year and estimated a 
relatively low cost per QALY (US$12,967 for the lower estimate to $30,081 for the higher 
estimate).  The authors state that these figures are well below the then low value consensus 
estimate of $50,000 to consider an intervention cost-effective.  However, the reader should be 
aware that there are a number of technical assumptions used in these calculations that could be 
queried.  Scott et al. (2011) also note that they examined only the costs of the incentive schemes 
and not the costs of changes in utilisation, prescribing or hospital visits. 
 
Reiter et al. (2006) surveyed 66 hospital CEOs in the PHA scheme to determine whether there 
had been organisational / structural changes to support the improvements of quality and safety 
due to the incentive program and whether process changes had been implemented due to the 
incentive program.  Of the 66 hospitals surveyed, approximately 75% reported making structure 
and/or process changes as a result of the incentive scheme.  Hospitals that reported structural 
changes reported more involvement and leadership by the board of trustees.  Hospitals that 
reported making process changes reported using the PHA incentives to increase leverage with 
physicians to assist in aligning physician objectives with the process goals.  Hospitals that made 
process changes also reported being motivated by competitive and financial considerations.  By 
comparisons hospitals that made no process changes were more likely to indicate that these 
factors had little effect on their motivation.  The authors suggest that the effects of incentives on 
hospital effort may not be universal and may depend on characteristics of the hospital and the 
hospital’s market. 
4.3 Other Best Practice Pricing Initiatives  
4.3.1 A Provider Driven Pay for Performance Program for Acute Episodic Cardiac 
Surgical Care 
Casale et al. (2007) implemented a pilot study of a provider driven best practice approach for 
coronary artery bypass graft patients in three hospitals within the Geisinger Health System in 
Pennsylvania.  The program consisted of 3 components – establishing implementable best 
practices; developing risk-based pricing and establishing a mechanism for patient engagement.  
 
Surgeons reviewed the class 1 and class 11a 2004 American Heart Association/American College 
of Cardiology Guidelines for CABG surgery and translated them into 40 verifiable behaviours.  
These were embedded in the ProvenCare program and the patient electronic record.  An adjusted 
best practice price was developed for purchasers by examining historical performance data on 
case volume and the predicted rates of adverse events and then bundling preoperative, inpatient 
and post-operative care over a 90 day period into a fixed price.  However, it is unclear how this 
pricing related to the prior payment structure.  Successful adherence to the ProvenCare processes 
was included as one component of surgeon’s individual compensation – up to 20% of total 
compensation for physicians was predicated on the achievement of predefined goals including 
measures of clinical care quality and safety.  It is unclear whether this incentive was already 
operational prior to the introduction of the scheme. 
 
There were 117 elective CABG patients in the year of implementation (2006) and these were 
compared with 137 Conventional Care patients treated prior to the introduction of the ProvenCare 
scheme (Casale et al., 2007).  There was no concurrent control group.  Before initiation of the 
program only 56% of elective patients received all 40 best practice care elements but at 3 months 
after implementation this had risen to 100% and fluctuated between 86%-100% for the remainder 
of the year.  This overall trend was significant (p < 0.001).  Analysis of the preoperative and 
operative characteristics of the groups was fairly similar.  Thirty day trends showed improved 
trends for outcome related indicators and lower rates for adverse events for the intervention group 
compared to the historical comparison group but this was only significant for the likelihood of 
discharge to home. 
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Financial outcomes indicated the average total length of stay for the ProvenCare group was 
slightly lower reflecting a 5% reduction in hospital charges.  All ProvenCare participating surgeons 
earned the incentive compensation for quality of care. 
 
Commentary provided with this article indicated that the scheme was considered a unique health 
care system within the US context and its applicability to Australia might also be limited.  The 
sample size was very small, and it used a fairly homogenous sample, considered atypical by 
commenter’s, which may limit the generalisability of the modest findings.  In addition, the 
information that is provided is unclear about which particular incentive factors may be associated 
with these improvements in performance (e.g. bundling of care, physician incentives, or shifted 
attention to care processes?  
4.3.2 Taiwan: Best Practice Pay for Performance Program for Breast Cancer 
In 2001 the Bureau of National Health Insurance in Taiwan implemented what it called ‘pay for 
performance programs’ for diabetes mellitus, tuberculosis, breast cancer, cervical cancer and 
asthma (Kuo et al., 2011, Li et al., 2010, Lee et al., 2010).  The study by Kuo et al. (2011) 
incorporated adjusted price payment for guideline adherence within a pay for performance 
program in Taiwan and thus is reported here under best practice pricing.  Other Taiwanese P4P 
initiatives are reported in the Safety and Quality Pricing/Pay for Performance Section. 
 
Kuo et al. (2011) report on the breast cancer program known as BC-P4P.  This is a retrospective 
population-based observational study with a cross-sectional design.  A total of 4,528 patients with 
Stage 1 or Stage II breast cancer diagnosed in 2002 or 2003 who received curative surgery were 
observed until the end of 2008.  Retrospective analysis of population based cancer registration 
and claims data was used.  
 
This program covered both medical costs and drug fees for both inpatient and outpatient services. 
Hospitals with more than 100 cases of breast cancer annually, a multidisciplinary team for breast 
cancer care and an in-hospital database that routinely collected survival and recurrence 
information were eligible to participate in the P4P program.  Patients receiving palliative care or 
hospice care without any curative therapy were excluded.  Payment for caring for BC-P4P 
enrolees is a bundled payment called ‘treatment mix’ which groups treatment options (surgery, 
chemotherapy, radiotherapy etc.) based on guideline recommended treatment for the specific 
stage of breast cancer.  The guideline(s) used are not specified. 
 
Payment for these ‘treatment mixes’ are set higher than for the original case-based payment 
scheme for surgery and the fee for service scheme for other related services and in this aspect it 
resembles a best practice pricing model.  For the hospital to receive the P4P payment for the 
treatment mix the patient needs to complete the full range of treatments in the plan, not part 
thereof.  Kuo et al. (2011) state that as a result of this the BC-P4P shares financial risk under the 
payment scheme and there is an incentive to improve patient’s compliance with treatment plans in 
addition to minimising any complications during treatment.  One might assume that if the patient 
does not complete the ‘treatment mix plan’, payment reverts to the original case-based payment.  
However, this is quite unclear. 
 
A second incentive was that BC-P4P hospitals earn an annual bonus if they met the goals for a set 
of stage specific survival rates.  However, the ‘treatment-mix’ might only be one of many factors 
that influence 5 year survival rates (e.g. severity, life style factors of patients etc.). 
 
The indicators for quality of care were derived through consultations with clinicians using a Delphi 
technique to build consensus within an expert group - but these indicators are not actually detailed 
in the paper.  The selected measures were coded as binary variables at the patient level and were 
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The study compared the quality of care provided by enrolled and non enrolled hospitals and 
evaluated the effects of the BC-P4P program on patient survival and recurrence.  The authors 
concluded that after controlling for age, stage, type of surgery and other potentially confounding 
factors BC-P4P enrolees were found to have better quality of care than non enrolees.  Regression 
models indicated that after controlling for patient characteristics quality of care was related to a 
better 5-year overall survival and a lower rate of recurrence. 
 
The study has a number of methodological weaknesses.  The authors note that high surgical 
volume was positively related to the quality of care and yet all enrolees were higher volume 
establishments.  It would have been preferable to have had a longitudinal design where the 
hospital performance before and after the introduction of BC-P4P was examined, where the 
hospital became its own control.  Due to these and other weaknesses in the study design, which 
the authors acknowledge, this study can only provide at best suggestive, rather than conclusive, 
evidence of a positive effect. 
 
4.4 Summary of the Evidence on Best Practice Pricing 
The following tables summarise the papers and studies reviewed. 
Table 1 Best Practice Pricing - details 




Payment by Results 
Guidance for 2010-
2011 
Dept. Health 2010 Govt. paper Adherence to practice 
pathway 
Adjusted Price UK 
Payment by Results 
2011-2012 
Dept. Health 2011 Govt. paper Adherence to practice 
pathway 
Adjusted Price UK 
Equity and Excellence 
Liberating NHS 
Dept. Health 2010 Govt. policy 
paper 
Various Various UK 
National Hip Fracture 
Database (NHFD): 
National Report 2012 
Currie C. et al. 2012 Govt. paper Adherence to practice 
pathway 




Mason A, Ward P 
& Street A 
2011 Book Chapter in 





Activity Based Funding 
and Adjusted Price/ 















2011 Review Paper Various Various Aus. 
Using Financial 
Incentives to Improve 
Performance of 
Hospital Clinicians 















Adherence to practice 
pathway 
Adjusted Price US 




Nahra T et al. 2006 Research Study Adherence to practice 
pathway 
Adjusted Price US 
Hospital Responses to 
Pay-for- Performance 
Incentives  
Reiter K et al.  2006 Research Study-
Survey of 
Hospitals 
Adherence to practice 
pathway 
Adjusted Price US 
A Provider Driven 
Pay-for-Performance 
Casale et al. 
(2007) 
2007 Research Article Adherence to Practice 
pathway 
Adjusted Price US 
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Program for Acute 
Episodic Cardiac 
Surgical Care 
Effect of Pay-for 
Performance Program 
for Breast Cancer in 
Taiwan 









Table 2 Best Practice Pricing - focus and context 
Article name Area of focus Context and setting Magnitude of the incentive 
Payment by Results 
Guidance for 2010-2011 
ABF in the UK most 
sectors 
UK National Health System –System 
wide reform and mandatory 
Substantial incentive payment in 
Best Practice Tariff 
Payment by Results 
2011-2012 
ABF in the UK most 
sectors 
UK National Health System – System 
wide reform and mandatory 
Substantial incentive payment for 
Best Practice Tariff 
Equity and Excellence 
Liberating NHS 
ABF in the UK most 
sectors 
UK National Health System – System 
wide reform and mandatory 
Substantial incentive payment for 
Best Practice Tariff 
NHFD National Report 
2012 
ABF and Best 
Practice Tariff in 
relation to hip 
fracture 
UK National Health System Substantial incentive payment for 




ABF in the UK most 
sectors 
Description of ABF in UK with a brief 




best practice in ABF and 
Future Payment Reform 
Review of ABF –
primarily acute care 
Review to advise future payment 
reform in Australia 
NA 
Using Financial 
Incentives to Improve 
Performance of 
Hospital Clinicians 
Review of Incentive 
schemes – mainly 
acute care 
Review of international and local 
quality incentive and disincentives 




2006 Incentive Program 
Acute care and 
outpatient 
BCBSM PHA Michigan –Health Insurer Between 3-5% of combined 
inpatient and outpatient operating 
payments depending on hospital 
quality score 
Cost Effectiveness of 
Hospital Pay-for- 
Performance Incentives 
Acute care and 
outpatient 
BCBSM PHA Michigan 2% of combined inpatient and 
outpatient operating payments 
depending on hospital quality score 
Hospital Responses to 
Pay-for- Performance 
Incentives 
Acute care and 
outpatient 
BCBSM PHA Michigan 2% of combined inpatient and 
outpatient operating payments 
depending on hospital quality score 
A Provider Driven Pay-
for-Performance 
Program for Acute 
Episodic Cardiac 
Surgical Care 
Acute care and 
outpatient 
Pilot program for Geisinger Health 
System Pennsylvania -Cardiac 
Adjusted price for Best Practice and 
incentives paid – magnitude 
unclear 
Effect of Pay-for 
Performance Program 
for Breast Cancer in 
Taiwan 
Acute Care and 
outpatient 
Demonstration project for P4P in 
Taiwan Health System – large sample 
Adjusted price for a bundle of care 
and other incentives paid – 
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Table 3 Best Practice Pricing - results 








Payment by Results 










Best practice indicators 
relating to adherence 
to pathway. (See also 
normative pricing 
aspects re day surgery 
rates and never events) 
No conclusive evidence as yet re 
BPT. Evaluation to be published 
shortly. 
Payment by Results 
2011-2012 
See above See above See 
above 
See above Changes in Best Practice Tariffs 
over time are indicative that 
changes are occurring. The 
strengthening of tariffs for some 
conditions might suggest the 
initial tariffs did not result in the 
required changes. Awaiting 
independent evaluation. 
Equity and Excellence 
Liberating NHS 
See above     









A range of best practice 
process indicators 
Overall the BPT is producing 
some improvements in the 
quality of care but this varies by 
process indicator. A greater % of 





NA NA NA Briefly describes Best 




best practice in ABF and 
Future Payment Reform 


























A 2011 review that examined 9 
research studies on the use of 
incentives to improve 
performance – insufficient 
evidence to recommend any 
scheme. Suggest adoption of 
adjusted pricing mechanism for 
best practice and never events 
could be considered. 
BCBSM Participating 
Hospitals Agreement 
2006 Incentive Program 








Hospital quality score in 
relation to pathway for 
best practice 
Evaluation studies are the 2 
studies following below 













Hospital quality score in 
relation to pathway for 
best practice 
Found limited, suggestive 
evidence that the intervention 
was cost effective and that 
practice improvements of 8-12% 
occurred following 
implementation.  
Hospital Responses to 
Pay-for- Performance 
Incentives 








Survey of Participating 
hospitals CMO’s 
attitudes to scheme 
implementation and 
changes made 
Hospitals making process 
changes were more motivated by 
competitive and financial 
considerations. Effects of the 
incentives were not universal and 
depended on the characteristics 
of the hospital and its market. 
A Provider Driven Pay-
for-Performance 
Program for Acute 
Acceptable 
practice 
Hospital Private Adherence to 40 care 
activities based on 
guidelines 
There was a time trend for 
improved performance re full 
adherence to care elements. Very 
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limited evidence of change in 
outcome measures when 
compared to historical controls. 
Incentives unclear. Small sample. 
Weak design. 
Effect of Pay-for 
Performance Program 




Hospital Public Adherence to 
treatment mix pathway 
Authors claim BC-P4P patients 
had better quality of care. 
Weaknesses in design make this 
suggestive evidence at best. 
Table 4 Best Practice Pricing - key points 
Article name Key points from article Impact Significance 
of impact / 
effects 
Self-reported strength 





This is a manual for Payment by Results in 
the UK 
Inconclusive as no 
independent 
evaluation as yet 




This is manual for Payment by Results in 
the UK 
Inconclusive as no 
independent 
evaluation as yet 
Inconclusive Does not discuss 
directly but tariff 
changes from the 
previous year imply 
some change in 





This is a white paper on strategic 
directions for NHS 





Shows changes in rates of adherence to 




but varies by 
indicator 
positive Overall substantial 
improvement on some, 






A descriptive paper on the approach to 
ABF in UK 
NA NA NA 
International best 
practice in ABF 
and Future 
Payment Reform 
Review of ABF to advise future reform in 
Australia.  





Hospital Clinicians  
A 2011 review that examined 9 research 
studies on the use of incentives to 
improve performance – insufficient 
evidence to recommend any scheme. 
Suggest adoption of adjusted pricing 
mechanism for best practice and never 
events could be considered. 
Indicates the effects 
of any particular 
scheme were of low 
impact  
Inconclusive The review indicates 
the effects of any 
particular scheme were 














An evaluation of the BCBMC Participating 
Hospitals Agreement Demonstration 
Project (Cardiac Care). It examined the 
cost effectiveness of the scheme and 
improvements in adherence to care 
elements from 2000 to 2003 
Weaknesses in the 
design make this 
study inconclusive 
Inconclusive Claims modest to high 
impact for cost 
effectiveness; shows 
modest improvements 




Survey of participating hospitals CMO’s 
attitudes to scheme implementation and 
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Article name Key points from article Impact Significance 
of impact / 
effects 
Self-reported strength 




changes made. Hospitals making process 
changes were more motivated by 
competitive and financial considerations. 
Effects of the incentives were not 
universal and depended on the 
characteristics of the hospital and its 
market. 







There was a time trend for improved 
performance re full adherence to care 
elements. There is very limited evidence 
of change in outcome measures when 
compared to historical controls. 
Incentives unclear. Weak design. 
Inconclusive 
although some 
positive findings are 
reported 
Inconclusive Modest 
Effect of Pay-for 
Performance 
Program for 
Breast Cancer in 
Taiwan 
Authors claim: 
 BC-P4P patients received better 
quality of care.  
 BC-P4P patients had better overall 5 
year survival and less recurrence. 
 Financial incentives in the payment 
design had a positive impact on 
outcomes 
Weaknesses in design make this 





Inconclusive High – but see key 
points 
 
Table 5 Best Practice Pricing - evidence and applicability  
Article name Evidence of 
service/system 
change 
Comments Overall applicability to Australia and 
to IHPA for ABF purposes 
Payment by Results Guidance 
for 2010-2011 
NA Awaiting independent 
evaluation report 
While such a scheme could be 
introduced in Australia evidence would 
need to be seen that the changes to 
the tariff system for best practice led 
to a significant improvement as 
measured by the quality/safety 
indicators. Some initial evidence. 
Payment by Results 2011-
2012 
Suggestive evidence 
as BP tariffs are 




Equity and Excellence 
Liberating NHS 
This is a strategic 
plan 
NA This is a strategic plan rather than an 
evaluation document 
NHFD: National Report 2012 Some evidence of 
system change but 
varies by indicator 
In the context of overall 
improvement, some minor 
drops in performance on 
some indicators occurred 
between 2011 and 2012 
which raises issues of 
sustainability 
Yes. The best practice tariff appears to 
have led to improvements on some, 
but not all, indicators 
England: The Healthcare 
Resource Group System 
NA NA NA 
Literature Review: Efficiency, 
International best practice in 
ABF and Future Payment 
Reform 
NA Discusses some approaches 
related to quality/safety 
adjustments in ABF  
This is a review related to ABF and 
raises some relevant issues 
Using Financial Incentives to 
Improve the Performance of 
Hospital Clinicians 
NA NA A useful reference as it summarises the 
rather limited evidence base for many 
of the initiatives up to 2011 
BCBSM Participating 
Hospitals Agreement 2006 
Incentive Program 
NA NA See 2 evaluation studies below 
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Article name Evidence of 
service/system 
change 
Comments Overall applicability to Australia and 
to IHPA for ABF purposes 
Cost Effectiveness of Hospital 
Pay-for- Performance 
Incentives 
Some evidence of  
system change but 
of modest 
magnitude 
Some issues with regard to 
the design and the way QALYs 
were calculated 
Yes with caveats concerning 
methodological issues 
Hospital Responses to Pay-
for- Performance Incentives 
NA A survey which raises some 
issues with regard to 
differences in hospital 
characteristics re whether 
they are motivated by 
incentive systems 
No but raises issues re incidental 
lessons learned e.g. hospital 
management structures and 
participation in change  
A Provider Driven Pay-for-
Performance Program for 
Acute Episodic Cardiac 
Surgical Care 
Some evidence of 
change but of 
modest magnitude 
A very small sample No but some minor positive findings 
reported 
Effect of Pay-for Performance 
Program for Breast Cancer in 
Taiwan 
Some evidence of 
change but there 
are research design 
issues 
A lack of clarity about the 
incentive system makes 
attribution of the effect 
unclear  
No – this study is inconclusive but 
some positive findings reported 
4.5 Conclusion: Best Practice Pricing 
The National Health Service of the United Kingdom has introduced the largest health system 
initiative to incorporate a range of best practice tariffs as adjusted prices within is healthcare 
related groups/ activity based funding model.  Although the NHS has made a substantial start in a 
range of clinical areas, evidence based pathways exist only for a limited range of conditions and 
this is an important limitation when considering such a funding model.   
 
Although it is due, the formal evaluation of the Best Practice Tariffs scheme is not yet available 
although a review of Payments by Results (PbR) has recently been published (Appleby et al., 
2012). However; a report from the National Hip Fracture Database (National Hip Fracture 
Database Report, 2012) has been released.  Before committing to such an approach there would 
need to be conclusive evidence that this approach is actually delivering meaningful gains in both 
safety and quality and that the scheme represents value for money in comparison to other 
potential incentive initiatives.  The adoption of this approach would require a substantial initial and 
ongoing investment particularly as best-practice guidelines and pathways can change quite 
substantially in responses to changes in the evidence base over time.  The Western Australian 
Health Department (HAPI, 2012) is planning to implement from 2012-2013 Performance-based 
Premium Payments for a number of clinical conditions (e.g. fragility hip fracture) which has been 
based on the UK Payment by Results Best Practice Tariff scheme (see Section 8). 
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5 Normative Pricing 
In this model price is used to influence the patterns of delivery of care.  This may include, for 
example, creating incentives for more home care or to incentivise day surgery procedures over in-
patient overnight stays where there is evidence to consider this appropriate.  The Section below 
describes international activities and information concerning Australian proposals can be found in 
Section 8. 
5.1 National Health Service (UK) 
In the National Health System for the UK the Payment by Results Scheme (Dept. Health 2011; 
Payment by Results for 2010-2011 and 2011-2012) prices have been set to incentivise day case 
surgery over in-patient admissions for a range of appropriate procedures suggested by the British 
Association of Day Surgery (BADS), covering: 
 
(a) breast surgery 
(b) hernia repair 
(c) female incontinence 
(d) minor orthopaedic surgery 
(e)  urology 
 
BADS publishes a directory of procedures that are amenable to day case or short stay admissions 
along with rates they believe are achievable (BADS Directory of Procedures, 2012).  The current 
BADS directory provides data reflecting day surgery rates and outcomes for England for the 2011 
calendar year. 
 
The prices have been set to incentivise providers to increase their day rates while ensuring that 
overall best practice does not cost commissioners more (Dept. Health 2011; Payment by Results 
for 2011-2012).  This has been achieved by: 
 
 Introducing separate prices with the day case prices relatively higher than the ordinary elective 
prices 
 Decreasing the absolute level of day case and ordinary elective prices to reflect the lower price 
of providing the BADS day case rate compared to the national average rate.  This means the 
day case rates are lower than if they had been set conventionally on current day case rates.  
 
An example is using a day case procedure for sentinel node mapping and resection for breast 
cancer.  The BADS case rate to be achieved is 80% and the Day Case Tariff is 300 pounds higher 
than the ordinary elective prices. 
 
There is also a BPT applying to Interventional Radiology which applies to two particular 
procedures (Endovascular aortic repair and Uterine fibroid embolisation).  The stated benefits of 
minimally invasive procedures facilitated by interventional radiology are said to include decreased 
lengths of stay, reduced risk of hospital acquired infections and faster rehabilitation and they are 
an alternative to open surgery.  However, it is recognised that they do not represent best practice 
in every circumstance because clinical considerations and patient choice may make open surgery 
alternatives legitimate. (Dept. Health 2011; Payment by Results for 2011-2012) 
5.2 British Columbia 
In British Colombia (Canada) from 2010 approximately 20% of hospital funding was shifted from 
global funding (fixed annual budget) to activity based funding (patient based funding) largely for 
acute inpatient and same day care.  The partial introduction of ABF was seen as a way to address 
surgical waiting lists by incentivising more day surgery procedures (Cohen et al., 2012) due to 
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payment based on activity.  In this context an incentive program has recently been introduced to 
reduce Emergency Department transit times (BC Health Services Purchasing Organization, 2010; 
http://www.bcpsqc.ca/about/documents/meetings/HQN-Nov102010HSPO.pdf).  An additional $600 per admitted 
patient is paid if they are admitted within 10 hours and there are $100 incentives for meeting target 
transit times for both high and low acuity patients who do not require admission.  There is no 
evaluation available on the effectiveness of this incentive strategy. 
5.3 Recent US Initiatives 
Kocher and Adashi (2011) report on a number of new initiatives in the US which target a reduction 
in hospital readmission rates.  Payment incentives to avoid readmissions have been cited in the 
Department of Health and Human Services strategic plan for 2010-2015.  The Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services National Strategy for Quality Improvement in Health Care 
strategy aims to obtain a 20% reduction in readmission rates by the end of 2013.  In order to assist 
in reaching such goals more funding is also being directed to programs that facilitate continuity of 
care between the hospital and the community and by funding more home care programs. 
 
The Community Care Transition Project aims to reduce hospital readmissions by addressing 
continuity of care between inpatient and outpatient settings and will provide funding for 
partnerships between hospitals and community based organisations.  A related initiative is the 
Independence at Home Demonstration Project (IAHP), which will provide comprehensive and 
coordinated care for home-bound chronically ill Medicare beneficiaries.  The IAHP will test novel 
payment methods wherein revenue sharing by health care teams can be realised subject to 
meeting specified quality and savings targets. 
 
Another initiative is the National Pilot Program on Bundling which will test the bundling of Medicare 
payments into a single comprehensive fee for an episode of care which ranges from 3 days before 
admission to 30 days post admission.  In this scheme participating clinicians and health care 
organisations will be entitled to revenue sharing in any or all savings garnered while assuming the 
risk for any excess cost incurred. 
 
These US initiatives are only just commencing and so it will be some time before any data are 
available to reflect on these changes in the patterns of care, and whether the incentives implicit in 
some of these programs achieve the goals of a reduction in readmissions and greater continuity of 
care. 
5.4 Specific Clinical Area: Radiology Reporting Times 
Andriole et al. (2010) examined whether radiology reporting signature times (RRST) could be 
improved by technology adoption combined with a financial incentive.  Poor turn around times 
resulting from lengthy signature time can adversely affect patient care.  The technology was a 
notification paging system that alerted radiologists when reports were ready for signature and an 
integrated speech recognition report generation system (PACS).   
 
Following the technology introduction period a financial incentive was added for target 
performance.  A $4000 p.a. bonus was added semi-annually to the regular salary awarded to 
radiologists who met the departmental signing goal of a median signature time of less than 8 hours 
or 80% of reports signed within 16 hours during the 6 months prior.  Signature times were 
evaluated prior to the technology interventions, following the technology interventions and prior to 
the introduction of the financial incentive and following the introduction of the financial incentive.  
Although there is comparison to a baseline period there is no concurrent control group which 
makes the attribution of the trend changes to the intervention uncertain. 
 
Median signature times and target performance improved following the introduction of the 
technology but improved even further following the introduction of the financial incentive.  The 
median 6 month 80th percentile signature time was 15-18 hours following the technology 
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incentive.  The authors concluded that the addition of the financial incentive led to better 
performance than was achievable through technology alone.  This is one of the few schemes 
where the incentive is directly paid to the clinician.  
 
Boland et al. (2010) undertook a similar study where radiologist report turnaround times (RTAT) 
was examined before and after the introduction of a pay-for performance scheme.  The incentive 
was a $5000 p.a. bonus on top of salary paid every 6 months for radiologists meeting RTAT 
targets.  Data were examined at baseline, at the beginning and at the end of the incentive period.  
Once again there is no concurrent control grouping, which makes attribution uncertain. RTAT 
times decreased significantly across these periods. 
5.5 Summary of the Evidence on Normative Pricing 
The following 5 tables summarise the findings of these studies.  It should be noted that it is highly 
probable that in most health systems/departments there will be some elements of normative 
pricing but very few of these may be reported in the academic and practice literature.  This is also 
the case in the Australian private sector. 
Table 6 Normative Pricing - details 




Payment by Results 
Guidance for 2010-2011 
Dept. Health  2010 Govt. Paper Normative targets for 
day surgery rates 
Adjusted Price UK 
Payment by Results 
2011-2012 
Dept. Health  2011 Govt. Paper Normative targets for 
day surgery rates 
Adjusted Price UK 
Beyond the Hospital 
Walls: Activity Based 
Funding Versus 
Integrated Health Care 
Reform 










providers to Do what is 






file on web 
Activity Based Funding 






and the Affordable Care 





2011 Journal article 
identifying 





and provision of more 
home care and 
continuity of care 
Various US 
Augmenting the Impact 
of Technology Adoption 
with Financial Incentive 
Andriole et al. 2010 Research 
study 
Normative – incentives 
for radiology reporting 
times 
Salary bonus US 
Radiologist Report 
Turnaround Time: 
Impact of Pay-for- 
Performance Measures 
Boland et al. 2006 Research 
study 
Normative – incentives 
for radiology reporting 
times 
Salary bonus US 
Table 7 Normative Pricing - focus and context  
Article name Area of focus Context and setting Magnitude of the incentive 
Payment by Results 
Guidance for 2010-2011 
ABF in the UK most 
sectors 
UK National Health System 
–System wide reform and 
mandatory 
Substantial incentive payment in Best Practice 
Tariff for meeting day surgery rate targets 
Payment by Results 
2011-2012 
ABF in the UK most 
sectors 
UK National Health System 
–System wide reform and 
mandatory 
Substantial incentive payment for Best Practice 
Tariff for meeting day surgery rate targets 
Beyond the Hospital 
Walls: Activity Based 
Funding Versus 
ABF and Integrated 
Health Care 
schemes 
British Colombia’s partial 
introduction of ABF to 
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Article name Area of focus Context and setting Magnitude of the incentive 
Integrated Health Care 
Reform 
which is a country wide 
problem. Some resistance 





providers to Do what is 




British Colombia’s partial 
introduction of ABF and 
introduction of incentives 
related to reduction of 
Emergency Department 
transit times 
A range of adjusted price incentives varying 
from $100-$600 per patient to reduce ED 
transit times for both admitted and non 
admitted patients  
Hospital Readmissions 
and the Affordable Care 
Act: Paying for 
Coordinated Quality 
Care 
Review  of planned 
US government 
initiatives and 
strategic targets to 
reduce readmission 
rates 
High readmission rate in the 
US which has not dropped 
since 2007. A range of new 
programs with incentives 
and also the introduction of 
penalties for excess 
readmission rate 
Various e.g. payments based on the bundling 
of inpatient and outpatient services and the 
provision of more home based Care. Revenue 
sharing by health care teams/ partnerships 
where targets and quality standards met 
Augmenting the Impact 
of Technology Adoption 
with Financial Incentive 
Using a salary 
bonus to facilitate 
technology 
adoption and also 
to reduce radiology 
reporting signature 
times 
A Radiology Department 
within a hospital, also 
servicing a local area which 
performs @ 750,000 
examinations per annum 
A salary bonus of $4000 per annum 
Radiologist Report 
Turnaround Time: 
Impact of Pay-for- 
Performance Measures 
Using a salary 
bonus to reduce 
radiology reporting 
turnaround times 
A Radiology Department 
within Massachusetts 
General Hospital with a 
throughput of @ 300,000 
examinations during the 
study period 
A salary bonus of $5000 per annum 
 
Table 8 Normative Pricing - results  








Payment by Results 











aspects within BPTs re 
day surgery rate targets 
No conclusive evidence as yet re 
BPT.  Evaluation to be published 
shortly 
Payment by Results 
2011-2012 





As above Further surgical areas being 
included in these Best Practice 
Tariffs for day surgery may 
suggest that the approach is 
working - but awaiting an 
independent evaluation 
Beyond the Hospital 
Walls: Activity Based 
Funding Versus 







Public NA Discussion article which 
questions the value of ABF in 





providers to Do what is 











and the Affordable Care 










NA NA. Describes a number of recent 
US initiatives to reduce 
readmissions and increase home-
based care. Many of these are 
only just commencing 
Augmenting the Impact 
of Technology Adoption 







Unsure Median radiology 
reporting signature 
times and target of 80 
Substantial reduction in radiology 





A Literature Review on Integrating Quality and Safety into Hospital Pricing Systems   Page 27 










hospital % of reports signed 















Unsure Radiology Reporting 
Turnaround times 
Radiology Reporting Turnaround 
times decreased significantly 
Table 9 Normative Pricing - key points 
Article name Key points from article Impact Significance 
of impact / 
effects 
Self-reported strength 





This is manual for Payment by Results in 
the UK 
No independent 
evaluation (as yet) 




This is manual for Payment by Results in 
the UK 
No independent 
evaluation (as yet) 
Inconclusive Does not discuss 
directly but tariff 
changes from the 
previous year imply 
some change in 








Discussion article which questions the 
value of ABF in general to address such 
issues as surgical throughput in Canada. 




providers to Do 
what is Best for 
Patients 
Describes an adjusted price incentive 
system related to ED transit times in 
British Colombia 
No independent 
evaluation (as yet) 




Care Act: Paying 
for Coordinated 
Quality Care 
A summary of new initiatives in the USA 
concerning reducing readmission rates -
through more coordinated care and 
home based care, bundling of inpatient 
and outpatient episodes, and also 
penalties for poor performance. 







An intervention to introduce new 
technology for radiology reporting, 
followed by a salary bonus incentive 
system which was found to both facilitate 
the acceptance of the new technology 
and substantially decrease radiology 
reporting signature times. 
Although there was 
a substantial drop 
in radiology 
signature times 
there was no 
concurrent control 












Impact of Pay-for- 
Performance 
Measures 
An intervention to reduce radiology 
reporting turnaround times by offering a 
salary bonus incentive 
Although there was 




there was no 
concurrent control 
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Table 10 Normative Pricing - evidence and applicability 
Article name Evidence of 
service/system change 
Comments Overall applicability to Australia and 
to IHPA for ABF purposes 
Payment by Results 
Guidance for 2010-
2011 
Suggestive evidence as BP 




While such a scheme could be 
introduced in Australia, there is no 
published evidence at present that 
changes to the best practice tariff 
system for day surgery have led to a 
decrease in inpatient surgical rates 
Payment by Results 
2011-2012 
Suggestive evidence only 





Beyond the Hospital 
Walls: Activity Based 
Funding Versus 
Integrated Health Care 
Reform 
NA Specific to the Canadian 
situation, which with its 






providers to Do what is 
Best for Patients 




and the Affordable 
Care Act: Paying for 
Coordinated Quality 
Care 
NA New initiatives which will 
require evaluation 
As these new schemes are introduced 
and evaluated it would be desirable to 
monitor their progress 
Augmenting the 
Impact of Technology 
Adoption with 
Financial Incentive 
Short term evidence of 
service change for a 
Radiology Department 
Suggestive evidence that 
salary bonus systems work in 
radiology but inconclusive 
Suggestive but inconclusive 
Radiologist Report 
Turnaround Time: 
Impact of Pay-for- 
Performance Measures 
Short term evidence of 
service change for a 
Radiology Department 
Suggestive evidence that 
salary bonus systems work in 
radiology but inconclusive 
Suggestive but inconclusive 
5.6 Conclusion: Normative Pricing 
The use of normative approach by the National Health Service (UK) to incentivise day surgery 
procedures is yet to be evaluated.  Queensland Health is proposing to introduce a similar strategy 
in 2012-2013 (Steele and Wright, 2012) and this proposal is discussed in Section 8.  Similarly a 
number of new US initiatives to reduce readmissions and to provide greater home based care are 
only at their initial stages. 
 
Some research studies in the radiology area have reported substantial improvements in 
performance, although due to weaknesses in the research design the level of evidence is weak.  
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6 Quality Structures Pricing Models 
This model of prospective pricing links pricing to structural approaches to quality and safety such 
as linking funding to accreditation or to participation in benchmarking activities or clinical 
quality registries.  Under this approach, for example, accredited hospitals are funded at a higher 
rate than non-accredited hospitals.  This is what occurred, for example, when casemix funding was 
introduced into Victoria (Duckett, 1995) where participation in the Australian Council of Healthcare 
Standards (ACHS) accreditation process was encouraged by the provision of an annual grant to 
each accredited hospital. 
 
In contrast to ‘payment for performance’, this model is best described as ‘payment for 
participation’. 
6.1 Accreditation 
The Commission has recently released National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards 
(NSQHS) to “drive the implementation of safety and quality systems and improve the quality of 
health care in Australia.  The ten NSQHS Standards are intended to provide a nationally 
consistent statement about the level of care consumers can expect from health services” 
(ACSQHC, 2011). 
 
The Standards provide a nationally consistent and uniform set of measures of safety and quality 
for application across a wide variety of health care services.  They propose evidence-based 
improvement strategies to deal with gaps between current and best practice outcomes that affect a 
large number of patients. 
 
The Standards (ACSQHC, 2011; p. 2) address the following areas: 
 
 Governance for Safety and Quality in Health Service Organisations 
 Partnering with Consumers 
 Preventing and Controlling Healthcare Associated Infections 
 Medication Safety 
 Patient Identification and Procedure Matching 
 Clinical Handover 
 Blood and Blood Products 
 Preventing and Managing Pressure Injuries 
 Recognising and Responding to Clinical Deterioration in Acute Health Care 
 Preventing Falls and Harm from Falls  
 
In September 2011 Australian Health Ministers endorsed these NSQHS Standards and agreed on 
a new national accreditation scheme.  Under this new national approach to accreditation, state and 
territory health departments have agreed that public hospitals across Australia will be 
progressively accredited to the NSQHS Standards from 1 January 2013.   
 
Given that all public hospitals will be progressively accredited against these new standards, 
nothing would be gained by the IHPA setting prices linked to participation in this process as all 
public hospitals will already be participating.  Accordingly, while we reviewed some evidence on 
accreditation as part of the current project, we have not included this evidence in table form as we 
have done in other sections.   
 
However, to summarise the evidence, most hospital accreditation systems typically measure 
processes (compliance with standards) rather than patient outcomes.  The underlying assumption 
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There have been a number of systematic reviews of the evidence on accreditation and the study 
by Greenfield and Braithwaite (2008) is representative of the broader literature.  They reported on 
a systematic review to identify and analyse research into accreditation and accreditation 
processes.  A total of 66 studies reported using empirical evidence.  The impacts of accreditation 
were classified into 10 categories: professions’ attitudes to accreditation, promote change, 
organizational impact, financial impact, quality measures, program assessment, consumer views 
or patient satisfaction, public disclosure, professional development and surveyor issues.  In two 
categories (promote change and professional development) consistent positive findings were 
recorded.  The evidence on the other quality measures was inconsistent across the various 
studies.   
 
There were also insufficient studies looking at the relationship between accreditation and 
consumer views/patient satisfaction to draw any conclusion (Greenfield and Braithwaite, 2008).  A 
more recent study by Sack et al. (2011) indicated that accreditation was not linked to measurable 
better quality of care as perceived by the patient.  However, an Egyptian study by Al Tehewy et al. 
(2009) did report that the accreditation of non-governmental health units had a positive effect 
regarding patient satisfaction and the continuation of performance according to the accreditation 
standards compared with non–accredited health units.  This study only examined data for the first 
year of accreditation. 
 
Shaw et al. (2010) examined systematic differences in quality management compliance scores 
between hospitals that were accredited or certified or neither.  The data indicated that quality and 
safety structures and procedures were more evident in hospitals that were accredited or certified 
(ISO 9001) versus those that were not.  Although there were some differences between accredited 
versus certified hospitals it did not substantially differentiate between hospitals that were 
accredited and those with certification only. 
 
A study by Scmaltz et al. (2011) examined the association between Joint Commission 
accreditation status and hospital performance on publicly reported quality measures for common 
diseases from 2004 to 2008.  Accredited hospitals had larger gains over time and were 
significantly more likely to have high performance in 2008 on 13 of 16 standardised clinical 
performance measures and on all summary scores.  A Japanese survey of teaching hospitals 
conducted in 2004 and 2005 (Sekimoto et al., 2008), with regard to infection control processes, 
suggested that hospital accreditation had an impact on hospital’s infection control infrastructure 
and performance.  Surveillance was implemented more frequently in hospitals with adequate 
infection control staffing.  However, the survey response rate of 52% places limitations on these 
findings. 
 
Pomey et al. (2010), using a multiple case-study approach, examined how the accreditation 
process helps to introduce organizational changes that enhance the quality and safety of care.  
The authors concluded that the accreditation process is an effective leitmotiv for the introduction of 
change but is nonetheless subject to a learning cycle and a learning curve.  Institutions invested 
greatly to conform to the first accreditation visit and reaped the greatest benefits in the next three 
accreditation cycles (3-10 years after initial accreditation).  
 
In the light of this equivocal evidence to support accreditation as a tool to drive improvements in 
quality and safety, embedding evidence-based clinical standards into accreditation systems 
represents a significant advance.  However, it is obviously too early to tell whether this will result in 
measurable improvements in quality and safety. 
6.2 Clinical Quality Registries and Benchmarking 
A clinical registry is a system that collects uniform data to evaluate specified outcomes for a 
population.  This population can be defined by a particular disease or condition (e.g. Australian 
Stroke Clinical Registry) or by the type of service provided (e.g. the Australasian Rehabilitation 
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of providers, to identify best practice and to drive improvements in quality/safety and patient 
outcomes. 
 
There is already a significant number of clinical quality registry and benchmarking systems in 
Australia (around 30 at present) and more are planned.  The Commission is currently drafting 
national arrangements for clinical quality registries including data and clinical governance 
arrangements and costed infrastructure options for best-practice technical design and operation of 
clinical quality registries (http://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/our-work/information-strategy/clinical-quality-
registries) and a Registry Special Interest Group has been formed to develop skills and experience 
in their management (http://www.med.monash.edu.au/sphpm/depts-centres-units/registries/registrysig.html). 
 
Despite this growing interest, we did not find any studies on the relationship between the level of 
funding on the one hand and participation in clinical registries and in clinical benchmarking 
systems on the other.  However, we did find evidence that participation in clinical registries and in 
clinical benchmarking systems can improve quality and safety.  An important aspect of clinical 
registries is that clinicians can review the (case-mix adjusted) performance of their service in 
comparison with other similar services which in itself may be an important driver for clinical 
practice improvement.  A selection of that evidence is included in the summary tables below.   
 
We also investigated the evidence on the relationship between funding and other quality/safety 
improvement activities such as Clinical Collaboratives, Total Quality Management (TQM)/ 
Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI), Business Process Re-engineering (BPR), The Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement (IHI)’s rapid cycle change, Lean thinking and Six Sigma. Again, we found 
no studies on the relationship between funding and these quality improvement activities.   
 
However, as summarised in the systematic reviews of clinical collaboratives and quality 
improvement models in health care reported below, the evidence for these approaches is, at best, 
mixed and inconclusive and not nearly as strong as for data-based clinical quality registries and 
benchmarking.    
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6.3 Summary of the Evidence on Quality Structures Pricing 
Table 11 Quality Structures Pricing - details 















Review of 3 models – 
centres of excellence, 
Pay for Performance & 
Pay for Participation 
For Pay for Participation, 
payer underwriting the 
costs of clinical-outcome 
registries and 
improvement activities 








Cut Costs And 
Improved The 
Quality Of Care 
Share D, 






of hospitals and 
physicians working in 
them 
Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield of Michigan/Blue 
Care Network fund nine 
regional collaborative 











2010 MJA Editorial  Clinical registries Not stated International 
Evidence for 









J et al 
2008 Journal 
article 















Five models of quality 
improvement: 
1: TQM/CQI 
2: Business Process Re-
engineering (BPR) 
3: IHI and rapid cycle 
change 
4: Lean thinking 




Not stated International 
Table 12 Quality Structures Pricing - focus and context 








Surgery Review of different approaches citing evidence from a 
variety of studies in the USA 
There are no direct financial 
incentives to take part in such 
plans. Payers cover the costs of 
data collection and quality 
improvement activities, but no 
one profits financially from pay-
for-participation programs 







Surgery The Michigan regional collaborative improvement 
program is paid for by a large private insurer. About 5 
percent of its total reimbursements to hospitals ($160 
million annually) are currently reserved for its 
Participating Hospital Agreement Incentive Program. 
This program includes elements of traditional pay-for- 
performance plans. However, 20 percent of the 
There are no direct financial 
incentives to take part in such 
plans. Payers cover the costs of 
data collection and quality 
improvement activities, but no 
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Article name Area of focus Context and setting Magnitude of the incentive 
Quality Of Care program’s overall budget is devoted to nine regional 
collaborative improvement programs, whose annual 
costs range from $1.2 million to more than $5 million 




role in quality 
improvement 
Not specified Australia had 28 clinical registries in 2010, which 
continuously collect patient-level health-related data, 
including outcomes, and operates across many health 
care sites. 
No incentives 







Not specified International systematic review. Of 1104 articles 
identified, 72 were included in the study. Twelve 
reports representing nine studies (including two 
randomised controlled trials) used a controlled design 
to measure the effects of the quality improvement 
collaborative intervention on care processes or 








Not specified International systematic review of both the academic 
and the practice literature. The material was reviewed 
by six reviewers with expert knowledge of the field 
(three from health care organisations and three from 
academic institutions) 
None specified 
Table 13 Quality Structures Pricing - results 





















Private Patient outcomes 
(various) 
Program in interventional cardiology 
showed significant improvement in 
providers’ adherence to evidence-based 
best practices. Reductions in mortality, 
unplanned coronary-artery bypass 
surgery, myocardial infarctions, 
nephropathy induced by the 
administration of contrast medium, and 


















Private Patient outcomes 
(various) 
In general and vascular surgery alone, 
complications from surgery dropped 
almost 2.5%, a change that translates into 
2,500 fewer patients with surgical 
complications each year and the 
estimated annual savings from this one 












All Patient outcomes 
(various) 
Cites as one example the registry set up by 
the Danish Lung Cancer improvement in 
30-day, 1-year and 2-year survival rates 
for people with lung cancer of 1.6%, 8% 
and 10%, respectively 
Evidence for 











All Patient outcomes 
(various) 
Systematic review of nine controlled 
studies showed moderate positive results. 
Seven studies (including one randomised 
controlled trial) reported an effect on 
some of the selected outcome measures. 
Two studies (including one randomised 






Various All Various In part because of variations in 
implementation, and in part because of 
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acceptable the methodological challenges of studying 
any complex intervention, there is limited 
evidence available to assess how effective 
these approaches are in health care (or, 
indeed, in industry). Data on the cost-
effectiveness of such approaches are 
largely lacking 
Table 14 Quality Structures Pricing - key points 














These programs are effective but difficult to 
organise (at least in the USA) context.  
Hospitals and surgeons are more accustomed 
to competing against one another than to 
collaborating. Programs are also expensive. In 
Michigan alone, 3 programs in surgery 















Quality Of Care 
Annual costs range from $1.2 m to more than 









role in quality 
improvement 
In Australia, new registries are required in a 
range of areas where improved quality of care 
is likely to lead to significant improvements in 
safety and outcomes. With high-quality data 
from clinical registries, there is a strong 
potential to engage clinicians more intensely 







Evidence for the 




The evidence underlying quality improvement 
collaboratives is positive but limited and the 
effects cannot be predicted with great 
certainty. Considering that quality 
improvement collaboratives seem to play a 
key part in current strategies focused on 
accelerating improvement, but may have only 
modest effects on outcomes at best.  
 
 







models in health 
care 
Regardless of the strength of the evidence 
overall, many studies provides insight into the 
experiences of implementing these quality 
improvement approaches in different health 
care settings, and broad lessons can be drawn 
about the potential for successful adoption in 
health care. 
Mixed Conclusive but 
not strong 
Weak 
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Table 15 Quality Structures Pricing - evidence and applicability 












Quality — Should 
Payers Reward 
Excellence or Effort? 
Yes Requires high quality clinical-outcomes data, which include procedure-
specific information on patient characteristics required for risk 
adjustment, processes of care, and relevant outcomes. Clinicians need to 
receive timely feedback on their performance relative to that of their 
peers.  Participants develop plans for specific interventions to achieve 
improvements. These interventions are later evaluated empirically, 
discussed at follow-up meetings, and refined. 
Yes 
How A Regional 
Collaborative Of 
Hospitals And 
Physicians In Michigan 
Cut Costs And 
Improved The Quality 
Of Care 
Yes As above Yes 
Clinical-quality 
registries: their role in 
quality improvement 
Yes Clinical-quality registries aim to improve quality of care through 
benchmarking clinical outcomes and stimulating competition in achieving 
best practice. In addition to providing information on safety and efficacy 
of treatment, data from registries can also be used to determine 
whether patients have timely access to care, and whether care is 
delivered in line with best practice and evidence-based guidelines. 
Yes 
Evidence for the 




Some Evidence is promising but further knowledge of the basic components 
effectiveness, cost effectiveness, and success factors is crucial to 
determine the value of quality improvement collaboratives. 
Yes 
A systematic narrative 
review of quality 
improvement models 
in health care 
Some There is a broad set of ‘necessary, but not sufficient’ conditions that 
need to be in place for successful implementation. These include: 
provision of practical and human resources; the active engagement of 
health professionals, especially doctors; sustained managerial focus and 
attention; the use of multi-faceted interventions; coordinated action at 
all levels; substantial investment in training and development; and the 
availability of robust and timely data through supported IT systems. 
Yes 
6.4 Conclusion: Quality Structures Pricing 
This model of pricing links pricing to structural approaches to quality and safety.  The most 
common approaches are accreditation, clinical quality registries linked to clinical benchmarking 
and other quality/safety improvement activities and the funding approach involves paying for 
participation in such activities. 
 
The most evidence for these approaches is to provide funding to allow clinical services to 
participate in clinical quality registries linked to clinical benchmarking (Birkmeyer and Birkmeyer, 
2006; McNeil et al., 2010; Share et al., 2011).  The evidence for this approach is strong in terms of 
achieving improvements in quality and safety.  However, there is no direct evidence on the links 
between performance and the level of funding.  Powell et al. (2008) note the lack of studies 
concerning cost effectiveness although the more recent study by Share et al. (2011) reports 
impressive savings for a clinical collaborative in Michigan although the cost for the initiative was 
also high.  
 
In relation to accreditation, there is already a national agreement that all public hospitals will be 
progressively accredited against the new National Safety and Quality Health Service Standards.  
Accordingly, nothing would be gained by the IHPA setting prices linked to participation in this 
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In relation to other structural approaches to quality improvement, the evidence is not sufficiently 
strong that these approaches actually do result in improvements in quality and safety.  There is 
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7 Payment for Performance (Safety and Quality Pricing) 
In Payment for Performance (P4P) or what are sometimes called “quality pricing models”, quality, 
safety and funding are linked through the payment of funding incentives for a high level of 
performance in relation to safety and quality indicators or through disincentives for a poor level of 
performance. 
7.1 Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (PHQID) 
This is a major demonstration project by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
that examines quality of care performance in heart failure, acute myocardial infarction (AMI), 
community acquired pneumonia, coronary artery bypass grafts (CABG) and hip and knee 
replacements.  Thirty three specific clinical indicators are used to reflect quality and safety 
performance and a composite score (CS) is derived for each clinical area.  
 
CMS is a federal agency within the US Department of Health and Human Services which is 
responsible for Medicare, the federal health insurance program for seniors and the disabled; 
Medicaid, a needs-based health care program jointly funded with the states; and various other 
programs and services.  The Medicare Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (PHQID) 
was a nationwide program that was run in collaboration with Premier Inc, a national alliance of 
non-profit hospitals.  Participation in the scheme was voluntary with approximately 60% of the 
Premier Inc. member hospitals agreeing to be involved (Ryan and Blustein, 2012).   
 
In the PHQID, hospitals are paid a bonus from Medicare according to their ranking of performance 
on the specified indicators compared with other hospitals in the scheme.  The model is known as 
‘tournament based pay’ because hospitals compete against each other to be in the top-performing 
group that receives additional payments.  For example, if hospitals performed in the top 10% for 
meeting the P4P clinical measures, a bonus payment equivalent to 2% of their annual diagnosis-
related group payment is paid.  If the hospitals’ performance ranking is in the top 11-20%, a 1% 
bonus is paid.  All hospitals in the top 50% are acknowledged by public reporting.   
 
The first phase of the program began in 2003 and the incentive system was redesigned for Phase 
2 which commenced in 2007.  Penalties for very low performing hospitals were introduced in 2006 
(Ryan, 2009; Ryan and Blustein et al., 2012) and continued into the second phase. 
 
The aim of the change to the incentive system in Phase 2 was to encourage greater quality 
improvement particularly among lower performing hospitals (Ryan and Blustein et al., 2012).  
During Phase 2 hospitals were eligible to receive attainment awards, top performer awards, and 
improvement awards.  An attainment award applied to hospitals whose composite scores in the 
current year exceeded the median of demonstration hospitals two years prior to the current year. 
The top performer award was paid to hospitals that scored in the top 20% in the current year.  The 
improvement award was given to hospitals with scores above the median of demonstration 
hospitals in the current year that ranked in the top 20% of demonstration hospitals for quality 
improvement (Ryan, 2012).  The amount paid for incentives increased from an average of about 8 
million per year in Phase 1 to 12 million per year in Phase 2. 
 
The indicators are largely process measures and remained very similar across both phases.  For 
example for AMI these included provision and administration of aspirin on arrival and discharge, 
beta blocker at arrival and discharge, angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor for left ventricle 
systolic dysfunction and smoking cessation counselling.  Eight additional process measures (e.g. 
performing an electrocardiogram within 10 minutes of emergency department presentation, lipid-
lowering medication at discharge, dietary modification counselling, and referral for cardiac 
rehabilitation) are now also included. 
 
Although the hospitals receive the bonus payments Ryan (2009) suggested these bonuses were 
not effectively distributed within the hospital’s clinical areas or to physicians, thus potentially 
lessening the impact of the incentives to change clinical behaviour.  Ryan (2009a) undertook an 
 
 
Page 38                                              A Literature Review on Integrating Quality and Safety into Hospital Pricing Systems  
analysis of mortality for the PHQID scheme in the USA and found no evidence that the PHQID 
scheme had a significant effect on risk-adjusted mortality for AMI, heart failure, pneumonia or 
CABG. 
 
A more recent study (Jha et al., 2012) analysed data provided by 252 hospitals and examined 30-
day mortality rates for more than 6 million patients with acute myocardial infarction, congestive 
heart failure, pneumonia, or coronary artery bypass graft surgery between 2004 and 2009.  The 
purpose of this study was to compare the effects of public reporting alone against a pay for 
performance model combined with public reporting.  All hospitals in the study were participating in 
Medicare Hospital Compare, a public reporting program which was running concurrently with the 
PQHID.  Non-Premier hospitals — those not part of PHQID — were used as a control group.  
 
The authors report that there was no impact on patient outcomes for hospitals in the Premier pay-
for-performance program compared with non-Premier hospitals.  Thus, participation in the pay-for-
performance scheme was not associated with a decline in mortality above and beyond those 
reported for hospitals that participated in public reporting alone.  Importantly, no difference was 
found in outcomes even for conditions in which mortality rates were explicitly incentivised (acute 
myocardial infarction and coronary bypass graft surgery).  This remained the case when 
measuring differences in improvements between poor-performing hospitals in the two groups. 
 
The authors concluded that both the size of the incentives and the targets matter.  They argued 
that, in the Premier demonstration, the incentives were small and patient outcomes were not the 
major focus.  They concluded that it is not surprising (in retrospect) that this program failed to 
improve patient care (Jha et al., 2012).   
7.2 Summary of the Evidence for PHQID and other USA Incentive Schemes 
The following tables summarise the papers and studies reviewed. 
Table 16 Incentive Schemes - PHQID and other USA schemes - details 




The Long-Term Effect of 
Premier Pay for 
Performance on Patient 
Outcomes 
Jha, A et al 2012 Research 
study 
PHQID Adjusted price USA 
Hospital-based pay-for-
performance in the 
United States 
Ryan, A 2009 Editorial  PHQID Adjusted price USA 





Mortality and Cost 
Ryan, A 2009a Research 
study 
PHQID Adjusted price USA 
Has Pay-for-
Performance decreased 
access for minority 
patients? 
Ryan, A  2010 Research 
study 
PHQID Adjusted price USA 
The Effect of Phase 2 of 
the Premier Hospital 
Quality Incentive 
Demonstration on 
Incentive Payments to 
Hospitals Caring for 
Disadvantaged Patients 
Ryan, A et al 2012 Research 
study 
PHQID Adjusted price USA 
Medicare's Flagship 
Test of Pay-for-
Performance did not 
spur more rapid quality 
Ryan, A 
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What's the Return? 
Assessing the Effect of 
"Pay-for-Performance" 
Initiatives on the 
Quality of Care Delivery 
Grossbart, S 2006 Research 
study 




on the quality of care 
for minority patients 
Karve, A et al  2008 Research 
study 
PHQID Adjusted price USA 
Public Reporting and 







PQHID  Adjusted price  USA 
Results from the first 4 
years of pay for 
performance 
DeVore, S 2010 Feature story PHQID Adjusted price USA 
The Effect of Financial 
Incentives on Hospitals 
That Service Poor 
Patients 





PHQID Adjusted price USA 
Making the Best of 
Hospital Pay for 
Performance 
Ryan, A and 
Blustein, J 





Do Hospitals Alter 








PHQID Adjusted price USA 




and Eligibility for 
Financial Incentives 
Mehta, R et al 2008 Research 
study 






and Remus, D 
2007 Research 
article 
PHQID Adjusted price USA 
Systematic review: 
Effects, design choices, 
and context of pay-for 
performance in health 
care 




P4P various Adjusted price Belgium 
Pay for performance in 
the Hospital Setting: 










Snapshot of Hospital 
Quality reporting and 
Pay-for Performance 
Under Medicare 
Kahn, C et al 2006 Research 
study 
PHQID and proposed 
MedPAC P4P  















CMS P4P Adjusted price USA 
Hospital Performance, 
the Local Economy, and 
the Local Workforce: 







CMS P4P Adjusted price USA 
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The Effect of the 
MassHealth Hospital 
Pay-for-performance 
Program on Quality 




MassHealth Adjusted price USA 
 
 
Table 17 Incentive Schemes - PHQID and other USA schemes - focus and context 
Article name Area of focus Context and setting Magnitude of the incentive 
The Long-Term Effect of 
Premier Pay for Performance 
on Patient Outcomes 
Acute care Assessed long term data As above 
Hospital-based pay-for-
performance in the United 
States 
Acute care Value-Based Purchasing model 
in development in the US 
Bonus payments to hospitals based on 
condition-specific composite measures, 
primarily process with some outcome 
measures. Initially paid to top ranking 
hospitals then changed to also reward 
high improving hospitals. Penalties 
applied to low performing hospitals. 
Effects of the Premier 
Hospital Quality Incentive 
Demonstration on Medicare 
Patient Mortality and Cost 
Acute care Value-Based Purchasing model 
in development in the US 
As above 
Has Pay-for-Performance 
decreased access for minority 
patient? 
Acute care Review of PHQID  As above 
The Effect of Phase 2 of the 
Premier Hospital Quality 
Incentive Demonstration on 
Incentive Payments to 
Hospitals Caring for 
Disadvantaged Patients 
Acute care Value-Based Purchasing model 
in development in the US  
As above 
Medicare's Flagship Test of 
Pay-for-Performance did not 
spur more rapid quality 
improvement among low-
performing hospitals 
Acute care Reviews impact of PHQID on low 
performing hospitals 
As above 
What's the Return? Assessing 
the Effect of "Pay-for-
Performance" Initiatives on 
the Quality of Care Delivery 
Acute care Evaluation of the Catholic 
Healthcare Partners’ hospitals 
that participated in PHQID 
As above 
Potential unintended financial 
consequences of pay-for-
performance on the quality of 
care for minority patients 
Acute care Review of PHQID As above 
Public Reporting and Pay for 
Performance in Hospital 
Quality Improvement 
Acute care Comparison of hospitals 
participating in the Hospital 
Quality Alliance (HQA) (a 
voluntary national public-private 
collaboration to collect and 
publicly report data) and those 
participating in PHQID. 
As above 
Results from the first 4 years 
of pay for performance 
Acute care Review of PHQID More than $36.5million was awarded in 
incentive payments in the first four years 
of the project, with $12million awarded 
during year four (2006-7 - the most recent 
year for which statistics are available) 
across the five clinical areas. 
The Effect of Financial 
Incentives on Hospitals That 
Service Poor Patients 
Acute care Review of to determine if there 
was any disadvantage to those 
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Article name Area of focus Context and setting Magnitude of the incentive 
patients. 
Making the Best of Hospital 
Pay for Performance 
Acute care Pre-implementation of the 
Medicare Hospital Value-Based 
Purchasing (VBP) program 
following the PHQID. 
Commencing in 2013 1% of DRG 
payments to be withheld (est $850 
million) increasing to 2% (est $1.91 billion) 
in 2017 
Do Hospitals Alter Patient 
Care Effort Allocations under 
Pay-for-performance? 
Acute care Review of PHQID As above 
Association of Patient case-
Mix Adjustment, Hospital 
Process Performance 
Rankings, and Eligibility for 
Financial Incentives 
Acute care Specifically evaluated cardiac 
care 
As above 
Hospital Size, Uncertainty, 
and Pay-for-Performance 
Acute care Data from year one of the 
PHQID was used augmented by 
Hospital Compare data for other 
hospitals for acute myocardial 




Systematic review: Effects, 
design choices, and context of 






Pay for performance in the 
Hospital Setting: What is the 
State of the Evidence? 
Acute care Literature review focusing on 
three P4P programs including 
PHQID, following release of 
planned Medicare P4P program 
to be considered by Congress. 
Various 
Snapshot of Hospital Quality 
reporting and Pay-for 
Performance Under Medicare 





Methods, Implications for 
Quality Improvement and 
Patient Outcomes 
Acute care Used 2004 to 2005 data from 
the Hospital Compare database, 
and process measures from the 
CMS P4P. 
Not applicable 
Hospital Performance, the 
Local Economy, and the Local 
Workforce: Findings from a 
US National Longitudinal 
Study 
Acute care  Value-Based Purchasing model 
in development in the US. 
Not applicable 
The Effect of the MassHealth 
Hospital Pay-for-performance 
Program on Quality 
Acute care The MassHealth P4P program 
was implemented in 2008 over 
the existing Hospital Compare, 
Medicare's public reporting 
program. During the study 
period hospitals were also 
required to report clinical 
quality measures for maternity 
care and measures of health 
disparities as part of the pay-for-
reporting program in 
MassHealth. 
Masshealth distributed $2.6 million for 
pneumonia process quality, an average of 
$40,000 per hospital, for 2008, however 
hospitals were eligible to earn much 
more.  
 
Table 18 Incentive Schemes - PHQID and other USA schemes - results 





Sector Quality measurement Results  
The Long-Term Effect of 
Premier Pay for 





Hospital Private As above The composite 30 day mortality at 
baseline was similar for the PHQID 
hospitals and the control hospitals, 
as were the rates of decline in 
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Sector Quality measurement Results  
mortality. There was no significant 
difference among the conditions 
that were incentivised (acute 
myocardial infarction and CABG) 
and those not linked to incentives 
(congestive heart failure and 
pneumonia). 
Hospital-based pay-for-
performance in the 
United States 
NA Hospital Private Process and outcomes 
for a range of specific 
conditions. 
The PHQID appears to have 
improved process performance, 
however it does not appear to 
have decreased mortality (which 
was incentivized for AMI and 
CABG) nor has it decreased 
inpatient cost growth (which was 
not incentivized).  





Mortality and Cost 
Promising 
practice 
Hospital Private As above PHQID has had no causal effect on 
mortality or Medicare cost for 
AMI, heart failure, pneumonia and 
CABG and evidence for the causal 
effect of the PHQID on outlier 
classification for heart failure and 
pneumonia is weak.  Risk adjusted 
mortality for AMI and heart failure 
is significantly lower for PHQID 
hospitals in 2006, however this 








Hospital  Private As above No association found between 
PHQID and reduced access for 
minority patients.  
The Effect of Phase 2 of 
the Premier Hospital 
Quality Incentive 
Demonstration on 
Incentive Payments to 




Hospital Private As above Changes in Phase 2 of PHQID 
resulted in a more diverse group of 
hospitals receiving incentive 
payments. Payment for 
improvements was the largest 
share of total payments to 




Performance did not 






Hospital  Private As above Quality improvement relative to 
that in matched comparison 
hospitals was significantly less for 
PHQID hospitals in Phase 2 than in 
Phase 1 of the intervention. 
Additionally it did not lead 
hospitals whose performance had 
been lower to achieve greater 
improvement in quality.  
What's the Return? 
Assessing the Effect of 
"Pay-for-Performance" 
Initiatives on the 




Hospital Private As above P4P had a positive impact on some 
of the clinical measures rewarded 
by the programs, and the impact 
increased with the size of the 
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on the quality of care 
for minority patients 
Routine 
practice  
Hospital Private As above Found that hospitals caring for 
large African American populations 
had poorer outcomes on process 
performance for certain 
conditions, i.e. acute myocardial 
infarction and community-
acquired pneumonia, but not for 
heart failure (the 3 diseases 
reviewed in the study). The 
difference in the heart failure 
disparities were thought to be 
related to limitations in the quality 
measurements for this condition. 
 
Public Reporting and 





Hospital Private As above The study was conducted over a 
two year period, and both the PFP 
hospitals and control hospitals (no 
financial incentives) demonstrated 
evidence of improvement in each 
of the measures of performance, 
although PFP hospitals showed 
greater improvement in some of 
the performance measures. 
However the incremental effect of 
financial incentives was reduced 
when adjusted for differences in 
baseline performance and other 
characteristics between the 
groups. 
 
Results from the first 4 
years of pay for 
performance 
NA Hospital Private As above NA 
The Effect of Financial 
Incentives on Hospitals 




Hospital Private  As above Study found that both nationally 
and among P4P hospitals, those 
that served poor patients had 
lower quality performance at 
baseline, however hospitals 
responded effectively to financial 
incentives, in AMI and pneumonia 
care and by the end of the 
program's third year for all three 
conditions.  
Making the Best of 
Hospital Pay for 
Performance 
NA Hospital Private As above NA 
Do Hospitals Alter 





Hospital Private As above Compliance with all reported 
performance measures improved 
in both groups of hospitals, for 
both easy and difficult measures. 
Hospitals in the incentivised 
program demonstrated slightly 
greater effort on easy tasks for 
heart attacks. There was no 
indication that improvement in 
effort in easy tasks compromised 
effort on more difficult tasks. 




and Eligibility for 
Acceptable 
practice 
Hospital Private As above Hospitals may perform poorly on 
process performance assessments 
because of their patient case mix, 
including a higher frequency of 
patients from minority groups. 
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Sector Quality measurement Results  
Financial Incentives Adjusting for case mix and the 
process measures used in the 
program would moderately 






Hospital Private As above Smaller hospitals were found to 
have five to seven times more 
uncertainly regarding their true 
ranks. 
Systematic review: 
Effects, design choices, 
and context of pay-for 
performance in health 
care 
NA Various Various Various NA 
Pay for Performance in 
the Hospital Setting: 
What is the State of the 
Evidence? 
NA Hospital Private All programs include 
clinical process 




safety and patient 
experience. Some set 
an absolute threshold 
for performance; 
others use relative 
performance. 
NA 
Snapshot of Hospital 





Hospital Private  As above Variations between the models 
were found for all measures of 
quality for the three conditions 
(heart attack, heart failure and 










Hospital Private Study used 7 process 
measures for AMI and 
4 for heart failure. 
A scoring system measuring the 
organisation of clinical and 
administrative activities, rather 
than a composite score where 
processes are weighted by 
treatment opportunity numbers, 
demonstrates a stronger 
association with mortality 
outcomes. 
Hospital Performance, 
the Local Economy, and 
the Local Workforce: 





Hospital Various Clinical process of care 
measures analysed 
An association was demonstrated 
between the level of economic and 
human resources and process 
scores, with less advantaged 
hospitals scoring lower. Hospital 
performance was found to 
improve generally, with early low 
performing hospitals increasing 
the most. However, disadvantaged 
hospitals did not reach the scores 
of advantaged hospitals over the 
2004 to 2007 period studied. 
The Effect of the 
MassHealth Hospital 
Pay-for-Performance 

















expanded to other 
conditions in 2010 
(based on a proposed 
Quality improvement for 
pneumonia was the same rate in 
both the study and control group, 
and for SIP the quality was about 
equivalent in 2009, even though 
the Massachusetts hospitals had 
been higher by 12 percentage 
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Sector Quality measurement Results  
design for Medicare's 
Value-Based 
Purchasing program).  
 
 
Table 19 Incentive Schemes - PHQID and other USA schemes - key points 
Article name Key points from article Impact Significance 











Study evaluated the long term effects of the 
252 hospitals in the PHQID, using a control 
group of 3363 hospitals that were 
participating in public reporting alone. 
Outcomes were assessed using 30 day 
mortality data of over 6 million patients 
between 2003 and 2009. While study 
concluded little effect from PHQID other P4P 
programs may be more effective. 
There was no evidence 
of effect from the 








the United States 
P4P programs should maximise incentives for 
meaningful quality improvement while 
minimising incentives for gaming and patient 
avoidance, including risk adjustment. 
 NA NA NA 







P4P programs are being rapidly introduced, 
with the PHQID frequently used for modelling 
other programs. This study found that PHQID 
has little impact on the value of inpatient care 
purchased by Medicare, therefore a variety of 
P4P designs should be considered as part of 
Value-Based Purchasing. 
 Mortality and cost 
growth was not 
reduced. 






Potential negative consequences of P4P 
programs include the allocation of resources 
towards measured activities and away from 
unmeasured activities, and patient avoidance 
or 'cream-skimming'. Theoretically, risk 
adjustment can counteract incentives to 
‘cream skim’, however it must be based on 
observable patient characteristics and must 
sufficiently compensate.    
Despite minimal 
evidence of minority 
patient avoidance in 
the PHQID, monitoring 
of avoidance should 






The Effect of 










Concerns have been raised that P4P may 
increase the quality gap between rich and 
poor hospitals. Where lower performing 
hospitals receive lower incentive payments, 
or face penalties, they will be less able to 
fund quality improvement initiatives. P4P 
programs that reward both performance and 
improvement in performance may avoid 
unintended consequences of P4P. 
Changes in Phase 2 
reduced disparity in 
payments between 








Flagship Test of 
Pay-for-
Performance did 






Changes in the PHQID in late 2006 were 
designed to encourage greater quality 
improvement, particularly among lower-
performing hospitals. However, there was no 
evidence that the change achieved these 
goals and therefore questions whether 
hospitals respond to the specific structure of 
economic incentives in P4P programs. 
No evidence of quality 
improvement in 
hospitals was found in 
this study, consistent 
with findings from a 
study on MassHealth 
(with larger financial 
incentives). 
No  Not reported 
What's the Hospitals in the Catholic Healthcare Partners Improvement in quality Conclusive - Not clearly 
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the Effect of "Pay-
for-Performance" 
Initiatives on the 
Quality of Care 
Delivery 
group had participated in other quality 
improvement programs, such as National 
Quality Forum and National Hospital Quality 
Initiative, and its strategic plan included 
increasing quality and patient safety goals. 
Four hospitals from the group participated in 
PHQID. A slight increase in pace of quality 
improvement was found in the P4P hospital 
compared with the control group, with 
program described as ‘sharpening the focus’ 
of the participating hospitals. 
of clinical processes 










the quality of care 
for minority 
patients 
The intention of P4P is to improve care for all 
patients, however the hospitals that treat 
large populations of African American (AA) 
patients may be disproportionately penalised 
under P4P, due to both patient and hospital 
characteristics.  This can be avoided by 
adjusting for case mix and demographic 
factors and rewarding improvement rather 
than setting targets.  
Financial pressures 
faced by poor 
performing hospitals 
may impede them from 
achieving 
improvement.   
Inconclusive Not reported 
Public Reporting 




The outcomes of using public reporting and 
P4P are largely unknown, including the effect 
of using them in combination with other 
programs.  This study analysed changes in 
measures of quality from hospitals that 
participated in both, compared to those who 
participated in public reporting only (control 
group).  
The effect of the 
incentives was found 
to be modest, however 
it is suggested that P4P 
may increase quality 
improvements when 
combined with public 
reporting. 
Inconclusive Not reported 
Results from the 
first 4 years of 
pay for 
performance 
Value-based purchasing (VBP) models should 
reward both attainment of quality of care 
benchmarks and overall improvements, and 
should phase in payment incentives gradually 
to provide disadvantaged hospitals time to 
adjust. Assistance and resources should be 
provided to hospitals that fall below national 
thresholds, and savings should be shared with 
hospitals to avoid perverse incentives that 
exist into the current system. 
Article reports that 
average composite 
scores of all quality 
measures within each 
clinical area have 
improved by 17.2% in 
the first four years, and 
that by March 2008, 
participating hospitals 
scored, on average, 
6.9% points higher that 
nonparticipants with 
respect to 19 Hospital 
Compare measures. 
NA NA 






There are concerns that hospitals that care 
for poor patients may be disadvantaged 
under P4P in comparison with those that have 
fewer poor patients; however these findings 
suggest that such financial incentive programs 
may improve quality for hospitals that care 
for more poor patients. 
Study concluded that 
there were no negative 
impacts on 
performance between 
hospitals that serve 









Making the Best 
of Hospital Pay 
for Performance 
Early results from the CMS program indicated 
that there were modestly higher rates of 
improvement for the diagnoses for which 
incentives were provided, however studies 
from the PHQID, and another P4P program in 
Massachusetts, did not demonstrate 
improved care. Concerns regarding negative 
unintended consequences of P4P, such as 
'cream skimming’, have not been founded.  
The quality of acute 
care has been reported 
by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research 
and Quality in 2010 as 
improving nationally, 
which may be 
attributed to the 
increasing awareness 
of quality issues and 
the means required to 
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the various P4P 
programs. 





P4P could provide perverse incentives to 
concentrate efforts on low cost 
improvements that provide bonus payments, 
and away from high cost efforts. Measure of 
process compliance in PHQID was classified as 
either easy or difficult to improve in relation 
to additional per-patient costs.  
Where P4P incentives 
resulted in increased 
effort on easy tasks it 
was not to the 
detriment of effort on 
difficult tasks, however 
generally the financial 
incentives were not 















Evaluation of the impact of hospital patient 
demographics, clinical case mix and mix of 
performance measures on process 
performance ratings (using data for acute 
myocardial infarction). It was found that 
moderate change in ranking would occur 
when accounting for these factors. 
Eligibility for financial 
incentives may be 
impacted if patient 
case mix and the mix of 
performance measures 
are not accounted for 








Setting: What is 
the State of the 
Evidence? 
Limited peer-reviewed articles were found, 
and most lacked a control group. PHQID has 
been found to provide a 2 to 4 percentage 
point improvement above control hospitals, 
however there is still a lack of knowledge 
about the effects of P4P programs, and its 
benefits compared to other quality 
improvement interventions. 





The impact of hospital size on ranking in P4P 
could be expected to be greater in smaller 
hospitals due to greater sampling variability. 
Development of P4P programs should address 
this uncertainty.  
Small hospitals may be 
more impacted by the 
use of simple ranks of 
composite scores, such 















Negative effects from P4P are rarely seen, 
including feared consequences such as 
gaming and inequity. P4P can improve quality 
of care with optimal design and alignment 
with context. 




Setting: What is 
the State of the 
Evidence? 
There is limited evidence about the effects of 
P4P, and those evaluations that were 
reviewed were found to have methodological 
flaws.  The most rigorous studies 
demonstrated a 2 to 4% greater improvement 
than what was observed in the control 
hospitals, however it is not known if the costs 
of running such programs outweigh the gains.   







Investigation of the potential impact of the 
PHQID and the P4P recommended by the 
Medicare Advisory Commission (MedPAC). 
Concluded that P4P could result in reporting 
issues or a focus on seeking bonus payments 
rather than improving care in a broad sense. 
Ranking varied 
according to model 






While P4P programs are commonly based on 
a single summary measure from a number of 
performance indicators, an alternative 
method for measuring performance may 
more accurately reflect patient outcomes and 
Care for cardiac 
patients is organised by 
both clinical and 
administrative 
processes, therefore 
Inconclusive Not reported 
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result in improved adherence to clinical 
measures. 
P4P programs that 
focus on administrative 
process measures may 





and the Local 
Workforce: 




An association between low performing 
hospitals and economic and human resource 
disadvantage was found. Low scoring 
hospitals demonstrated greater increases in 
performance however were unable to attain 
the levels of base-line higher performers. This 
indicates that P4P programs that credit 
improvement from base-line, or 
improvements over long timeframes could be 
more equitable. 
P4P programs could 
exacerbate inequalities 










Although Medicare's Value-Based Purchasing 
Program is to be implemented in 2013 there 
has been very few studies done on P4P 
programs and there is limited evidence to 
support their effectiveness. This is the first 
study evaluating the effect of the MassHealth 
P4P program which was introduced in 2008. 
There was no evidence 
of improvement in 
quality of care for 
pneumonia or surgical 




Table 20 Incentive Schemes - PHQID and other USA schemes - evidence and 
applicability 
Article name Evidence of 
service/system 
change 
Comments Overall applicability 
to Australia and to 
IHPA for ABF 
purposes 
The Long-Term Effect of 
Premier Pay for Performance 
on Patient Outcomes 
No One of the few studies using a contemporary 
control group and long term data. Outcomes 
limited to 30 day mortality rates. 
Yes, with caveats. 
Stated limitations 
including inability to 
control for 
differences in study 
and control group  
Hospital-based pay-for-
performance in the United 
States 
NA Concludes that emerging evidence suggests that, 
to date, P4P has not improved value for Medicare. 
Yes 
Effects of the Premier 
Hospital Quality Incentive 
Demonstration on Medicare 
Patient Mortality and Cost 
No Study suggests that P4P models could be of 
benefit, however focus on process measures may 
not maximise benefits. 
Yes 
Has Pay-for-Performance 
decreased access for minority 
patient? 
No Some stated limitations in study, including that 
sample of hospitals in PHQID may not be 
generalisable. However analytical method could be 
utilised. 
Yes – with caveats. 
Very specific to the 
US healthcare context 
– questionable 
whether relevant to 
Australia 
The Effect of Phase 2 of the 
Premier Hospital Quality 
Incentive Demonstration on 
Incentive Payments to 
Hospitals Caring for 
Disadvantaged Patients 
Yes – short term Evidence of some benefit in incentivising 
improvement from baseline in addition to ranking. 
Yes 
Medicare's Flagship Test of 
Pay-for-Performance did not 
spur more rapid quality 
improvement among low-
performing hospitals 
No Although some positives were found from the 
Phase 2 changes in Ryan’s study above, this study 
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Article name Evidence of 
service/system 
change 
Comments Overall applicability 
to Australia and to 
IHPA for ABF 
purposes 
What's the Return? Assessing 
the Effect of "Pay-for-
Performance" Initiatives on 
the Quality of Care Delivery 
Yes – short term Used pre-intervention and post-intervention data 
and a control group. Sample of only 4 hospitals 
compared data across one 2 years. 
No –issues with study 
Potential unintended 
financial consequences of 
pay-for-performance on the 
quality of care for minority 
patients 
NA There were issues with the methodology and 
scope of the study, which was performed early in 
the intervention. 
No 
Public Reporting and Pay for 
Performance in Hospital 
Quality Improvement 
Yes, short term 
- minimal 
There were stated limitations with the study, 
including lack of comparison between no 
incentives and a single incentive. Difficulty with 
generalisability.  
No 
Results from the first 4 years 
of pay for performance 
NA Bias evident towards a particular model of P4P (or 
value-based purchasing), evident in the analysis of 
the P4P projects. Opinion piece. 
No 
The Effect of Financial 
Incentives on Hospitals That 
Service Poor Patients 
Yes - minimal Study only reviewed three conditions and had 
many stated limitations, including the sample of 
hospitals. Generalisability from the US to the 
Australian setting could be limited. 
No 
Making the Best of Hospital 
Pay for Performance 
No Article provides an overview of the various P4P 
programs implemented in the US, confirming the 
lack of evidence demonstrating positive outcomes. 
Yes 
Do Hospitals Alter Patient 
care effort Allocations under 
Pay-for-Performance? 
No Study conducted on the early years of PHQID.  Yes, with caveats. No 
pre-intervention data 
available and only 
subset of measures in 
three conditions 
analysed.  
Association of Patient case-
Mix Adjustment, Hospital 
Process Performance 
Rankings, and Eligibility for 
Financial Incentives 
NA Evaluation was only of patients with acute AMI 
using 8 performance measures from the CMS 
program, however highlights issues with adjusting 
for variations in hospital characteristics 
Yes, with caveats. 
Limited performance 
measures analysed  
Pay for Performance in the 
Hospital Setting: What is the 
State of the Evidence? 
NA Literature review confirming lack of evidence of 
benefits of P4P. 
Yes 
Hospital Size, Uncertainty, 
and Pay-for-Performance 
NA Findings were stated as being generalisable, 
although based on one year's data only. 
Yes – with caveats. 
Analysed data from 
the first year only 
Systematic review: Effects, 
design choices, and context 
of pay-for performance in 
health care 
NA Six recommendations were concluded from this 
review however future research was 
recommended. 
NA 
Pay for performance in the 
Hospital Setting: What is the 
State of the Evidence? 
NA This literature review identifies the limited 
evidence base that existed in 2007 in the US. 
No 
 
Snapshot of Hospital Quality 
reporting and Pay-for 
Performance Under Medicare 
NA Comparative data includes only two quarters 
which were released in 2005, therefore is very 
preliminary. 
No - issues with study 
Alternative Pay-for-
Performance Scoring 
Methods, Implications for 
Quality Improvement and 
Patient Outcomes 
NA Study evaluated AMI and heart failure, however 
only one outcome measure was used (inpatient 
mortality secondary to AMI).  
No 
Hospital Performance, the 
Local Economy, and the Local 
Workforce: Findings from a 
US National Longitudinal 
Study 
NA Analysed data for two conditions only; acute 
myocardial infarction and heart failure, and 
disadvantaged hospitals were under-represented 
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Article name Evidence of 
service/system 
change 
Comments Overall applicability 
to Australia and to 
IHPA for ABF 
purposes 
The Effect of the MassHealth 
Hospital Pay-for-performance 
Program on Quality 
No Suggestive evidence that there was no 
improvement in quality of care, however 
evaluation was in the early stage of the program 
with only 2 'conditions' incentivised. 
Yes, with caveats. 
Analysed pneumonia 
(2 years data) and 
surgical infections (1 
year data) only 
7.3 Conclusion: PHQID and other USA Incentive Schemes 
The setting for the PHQID is significantly different to the Australian setting as the US hospital 
system is primarily owned and operated by the private sector, as both for-profit and not-for 
organisations.  The public hospitals that operate are not part of a nationwide system but rather are 
owned by various levels of government from federal through to city.  Funding is generally provided 
directly to the provider from the patient and the health insurer, with government funding being only 
available to those who are eligible under the various programs, such as Medicare.  
 
While there have been many research studies conducted on the PHQID, there is no convincing 
evidence that demonstrates any beneficial outcomes that can be attributed to the program.  It 
should be noted that many of the studies are limited by issues with generalisation, due to the fact 
that there were less than 300 participating hospitals and these facilities volunteered to take part in 
the program (Grossbart, 2006).  In addition, the project was limited to only a few conditions, and as 
CMS had also implemented a public reporting program, the individual effect of the P4P incentives 
was difficult to determine.  
 
The most recent study (Jha et al., 2012) is also the most definitive.  It found no impact on patient 
outcomes for hospitals in the Premier pay-for-performance program compared with non-Premier 
hospitals (i.e. no difference in patient outcomes above and beyond those reported for hospitals 
that participated in public reporting alone).  Importantly, no difference was found in outcomes even 
for conditions in which mortality rates were explicitly incentivised and this remained the case when 
measuring differences in improvements between poor-performing hospitals in the two groups.   
 
Many concerns had been raised about unintended, negative consequences of the PHQID project, 
such as patient avoidance, disadvantage to hospitals with larger minority patient populations and 
neglect of unmeasured processes.  However, there was no evidence found to support such claims 
(Jha et al, 2010; Nicholas et al, 2010; Ryan, 2010; Ryan et al, 2012), although the change in 
Phase 2 of the project that rewarded improvements in care was a means of addressing these 
concerns. 
 
In the US, Medicare is continuing with the P4P strategy with the implementation of the Value-
Based-Purchasing Program in 2013, largely based on the PHQID project (Blustein et al, 2010).   
7.4 Other International Incentive Schemes 
This section deals with other international schemes and information on Australian initiatives can be 
found in Section 8. 
7.4.1 Advancing Quality Initiative (AQ; England) 
This is very similar to, and based on, the PHQID scheme.  Similar clinical areas were utilised 
(acute myocardial infarction, pneumonia, heart failure, hip and knee replacement and coronary 
artery bypass grafts).  It has been running in 24 acute Hospital Trusts in North-West (NW) England 
since 2008.  Twenty-eight specific indicators and a Composite Quality Score (CQS) within each of 
the five clinical areas were utilised (NHS Northwest and Premier Advancing Quality Program, 
2010).  In recent times there has been an expansion of the scheme into areas such as mental 
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All hospitals in NW England were mandated to participate in the scheme.  This is a tournament 
based scheme where bonuses are paid on relative performance in comparison with other trusts in 
the scheme.  The trusts are sorted in descending order by their CQS.  The top 25% of all Trusts 
participating in each clinical area receive a 4% quality incentive payment for these conditions.  
Trusts in the 2nd quartile receive a 2% quality incentive payment.  There were no penalties 
incorporated into the AQ.   
 
In the second year of the program the incentives changed so that hospitals could earn 
“attainment”, “improvement” and “achievement” bonuses based on three different indicators of 
improvement from the first year to the next, which include both individual and comparative 
outcomes (Sutton, 2012).  Additional funds from these bonuses are directed internally to the 
relevant high achieving clinical teams for clinical care quality improvement schemes.  The decision 
regarding bonus utilisation was made collectively by the hospitals, and the hospitals also 
collaborated in regular meetings where their experiences were shared, and the public reporting of 
results (Sutton, 2012).  Other support was provided for quality improvement, including centralised 
data support and QI activities within the hospitals.  
 
The payment incentives in the AQ are somewhat greater than for the PHQID scheme (4% 
compared to 2% for top performing hospitals) and apply to a greater band of relative performance 
(top 50% versus top 20%).  In the PHQID only the top 10% of hospitals received the highest 
bonuses, compared to the top 25% in the AQ.  Another significant difference is that the PHQID 
scheme in the USA was not mandated leading to the potential for selection effects. 
 
The manual for calculating composite scores (NHS Northwest and Premier Advancing Quality 
Program, 2010) indicates that the calculation is quite complex.  It involves a weighting system and 
it varies by clinical area.  For conditions such as CABG, Pneumonia and Heart Failure, the CQS is 
based on the Composite Process Score as only process measures apply to these areas.  
However, for the clinical areas of AMI and hip/knee replacements the indicators include both 
process and outcome measures.   
 
AQ CQS = Composite Process Score (CPS) + Composite Outcome Score (COS) 
 
The Composite Outcome Score (COS) for AMI takes into account the actual and expected 
mortality rates and the actual and expected survival rates and for hip/knee includes 28 day 
expected and actual readmission rates and actual and expected readmission avoidance rates.  
The COS accounts for a smaller proportion of the CQS than do the process measures.  For 
example, for AMI there are 7 process indicators and 1 combined outcome measure and these are 
of equal weight.  The technical background to the development of these scores is not provided and 
thus we were unable to ascertain whether these are valid and reliable measures and whether the 
combining rules and weights are appropriate.  
 
There is a website which provides data on the composite quality scores for each trust, by clinical 
area, over a three year period (www.advancingqualitynw.nhs.uk).  Improvement shifts in the Composite 
Quality Scores by quartile can be observed between the first year of operation (April 2008-March 
2009) and the third year of operation (April 2010-March 2011).  For example the average 
improvement CQS percent scores increased by 1.48% for CABG and up to 21.45% for heart 
failure (www.advancingqualitynw.nhs.uk/news).  The University of Nottingham is responsible for the 
evaluation of the scheme which commenced in March 2009 and the Final Report of this evaluation 
is due in 2014 (www.netscc.ac.uk/hsdr/projectdetails.php?ref=08-1809-250). 
 
Sutton et al. (2011), in a report of some preliminary findings from the evaluation team, examined 
whether the AQ program had an impact on short-term in-hospital mortality.  They compared in-
hospital mortality for the NW hospitals with the rest of England and related changes in the AQ 
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Data from three clinical areas were analysed: pneumonia, acute myocardial infarction and heart 
failure. Using a “difference-in difference analysis” the results suggest that the introduction of the 
AQ program was associated with reduced short-term mortality risk amongst patients with 
pneumonia and heart failure but not with AMI.  Heart failure mortality declined by 1.2% and 
pneumonia mortality declined by 1.8%.  The authors estimated that, in the first year of the scheme, 
520 deaths were averted for bonuses totalling 3.2 million pounds.   
 
A more recent paper by Sutton et al. (2012) which analysed data for the first 18 months of the 
scheme in relation to the 18 months prior to scheme commencement and found a risk adjusted 
1.3% drop in 30 day in-hospital absolute mortality across these three conditions when compared 
with 132 other hospitals in England.  The relative reduction in mortality was equivalent to 6% or 
890 fewer deaths in the period.  The largest absolute reduction for pneumonia (1.9%) was 
significant with non significant reductions for AMI (0.6%) and heart failure (0.6%).  Following the 
first 18 months the program was absorbed into a new pay for performance program that applied 
across all of England and the new program involved withholding of payments rather than bonuses 
so further longitudinal data is not available. 
 
Ryan (2009) undertook a similar analysis of mortality for the PHQID scheme in the USA and found 
no evidence that the PHQID scheme had a significant effect on risk-adjusted mortality for AMI, 
heart failure, pneumonia or CABG.  It is noted, however, that the incentives in the UK were much 
higher and there were some other differences between the schemes (e.g. voluntary versus 
mandatory). 
 
However, the composite quality scores (CQS) for the NW hospitals for the three conditions were 
not significantly associated with these changes in patient mortality (Sutton et al., 2011).  As this 
might indicate problems in how the composite scores were calculated, the authors analysed each 
quality indicator separately.  Sutton et al. (2011) found that only one of the fourteen individual 
indicators was significantly negatively associated with the mortality rate.  The authors suggest that 
the beneficial effects of the scheme may not be largely captured by the specific and composite 
quality indicators, which raises some questions concerning the meaning of the improvement of the 
CQS scores that have been reported. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, there is more evidence available to assess the operation and 
outcomes of this scheme as contrasted with others.  It is worthy of more detailed exploration. 
7.4.2 Commissioning for Quality and Innovation Payment Framework (CQUIN) 
This scheme, introduced in 2009, links payments to locally agreed quality improvement programs 
and outcomes.  In 2008 the impact of a range of quality improvement models was considered and 
the model chosen was making payment for activity reflect quality in a national framework with local 
discretion (Dept. Health 2008, CQUIN 08 Impact Review).  Local commissioners withhold a small 
proportion of total contract revenue conditional on the provider achieving locally agreed quality 
improvements.  
 
CQUIN applies to all acute, ambulance, community, mental health and learning disability services 
in England.  For acute hospitals there were also two national goals in 2010/11 – reducing the 
avoidable effects of venous-thromboembolism (VTE) and improving responsiveness to patient’s 
needs.  In 2011/12 two additional goals of were added – (a) improving awareness of and diagnosis 
of dementia (using risk assessment)  and (b) data collection to measure harms caused to patients 
in the areas of pressure ulcers, falls, urinary tract infection (in patients with a catheter) and VTE.  
 
The national goals are to account for 1/5 of the value of local schemes or 0.3% of provider income 
(Scott et al. 2011).  In 2010/11 the size of the incentive paid to each organisation was 1.5% of total 
revenue and for 2012-2013 it is 2.5% (CQUIN Summary Sheet 2011/12).  Fifty percent of the 
payments are made in advance (to avoid cash flow problems) and the remaining payment is 
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as much for participation in local quality initiatives and for reporting specified indicators as for 
actual performance. 
 
In addition to the national data, many of the local programs also involve the collection of data to 
measure harms caused to patients.  As well there is a regionally mandated CQUIN scheme which 
examines the measurement of patient experience including asking patients whether they would 
recommend the service to their friends and family.  This presumably is an endeavour to meet the 
goal of improving responsiveness to patient needs and for the services to be patient centred but 
the usefulness and validity of such a global indicator has yet to be evaluated.  Literature 
concerning the assessment of patient satisfaction would suggest that there may be high rates of 
endorsement for such items regardless of the quality of care received (Hawthorne et al. 2006). 
Recently, a more substantive Outcomes and Experiences Questionnaire has been developed by 
the NHS which may be used in a number of NHS initiatives including CQUIN.  This contains a 
number of items on patient experience (5 items) and outcomes (5 items) but also contains within it 
a health status index (the EQ-5D) which has the potential for use in economic analyses. This 
questionnaire is currently undergoing validation (Gibbons et al., 2012). 
 
CQUIN goals cannot be minimum standards.  A goal is tied to an indicator and an associated 
payment threshold.  The following example demonstrates these aspects: 
 
Goal: to improve the health of babies and mothers in the 14 days after birth 
Indicator: rate of emergency admissions/readmissions to hospital of the baby within 14 
days per 1000 live births 
Payment Threshold: fewer than 8 emergency admissions per 1000 live births.  
 
These thresholds are informed by available evidence (e.g. NICE Quality Standard, National 
Service Framework or benchmarking) and by the providers own baseline.  This standard will 
probably increase over time and be reviewed annually. 
 
An independent academic evaluation report on this scheme was due at the end of March 2012 
(Department of Health 2010, CQUIN Summary Guide) but is unavailable as yet.  However, a 
summary of the CQUIN scheme for 2011/12 has recently been published (CQUIN 2011/12 
Summary Sheet).  It reported that the key outcomes for patients were as follows: 
 
1. Over 90% of all patients admitted to acute hospital environments received a VTE risk 
assessment. 
2. More people nearing the end of their life had an opportunity to express their wishes about 
their preferred place of death. 
3. There was a reduction in the number of grade 3 and 4 pressure ulcers across the health 
economy and all category 3 and 4 ulcers are investigated as Serious Incidents. 
4. Smoking is the most important preventable cause of ill health, deaths and use of health 
care service.  Providers were able to identify people who smoked and provide key 
information which offered opportunities to make a quit attempt. 
5. Access to Mental Health Services is now streamlined to ensure that appropriate provision 
is made by a single point of entry into the service leading to care being provided along care 
pathways. 
6. Improved patient experience has been central to the service provision across all providers.  
This summary is notably lacking in detailed evaluation data.  The forthcoming evaluation report 
may provide the substantive evidence that would be required to clarify these claims and to address 
any findings concerning the impact of this scheme. 
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7.4.3 Pay for Performance Initiatives from Taiwan 
In 2001 the Bureau of National Health Insurance in Taiwan implemented pay for performance 
programs for diabetes mellitus, tuberculosis, breast cancer, cervical cancer and asthma (Kuo et 
al., 2011, Li et al., 2010, Lee et al., 2010).  Some of these programs later became national 
initiatives.  Initial reports on diabetes, tuberculosis and breast cancer have recently been 
published.  The breast cancer initiative has been reported in the section on best practice pricing as 
it seems closest to that model.  None of these studies have sufficient detail as to the nature of 
financial incentives provided and, although the hospitals receive the incentive funding, it is unclear 
how this is distributed to the participating clinical areas.  As well, all the studies are retrospective 
natural or field observational studies with recognised methodological weaknesses limiting the 
generalisability of their findings. 
Tuberculosis 
In order to make tuberculosis (TB) treatment more effective and to lower the transmission rate of 
the disease a pay for performance demonstration project for tuberculosis was introduced in 2001 
by the Bureau of National Insurance.  The national P4P-TB program was officially implemented at 
the beginning of 2004 (Li et al., 2010). TB cases identified during 2002 – 2003 constituted the pre-
programme group cases (N = 24,754) and excluded any cases that had been in the prior 
demonstration project.  TB cases identified after the 1 January 2004 were defined as the post-
programme group (N = 33,536).  Cases with ICD-9-CM code 010-018 were included but other 
cases of tuberculosis (e.g. multi-drug resistant TB) were excluded. 
 
This is a retrospective study which compared TB cases in the national datasets of Taiwan before 
and after the full implementation of P4P-TB in relation to the cure rate and the average length of 
treatment.  It is actually a cross-sectional study as the performance of each hospital before and 
after the implementation is not assessed.  As with the cancer initiative the hospitals/ physicians in 
Taiwan could choose to participate in the P4P program if the participating physicians had 
specialist licensing in infectious disease/tuberculosis and the hospital had more than 100 new 
cases under treatment and a full-time TB Case Manager.  The authors used various statistical 
techniques to endeavour to overcome this selection bias. 
 
The incentive scheme was designed around 4 chronological stages of treatment for TB over a 12 
month period.  The first stage was identification and points were earned by hospitals, physicians 
and case managers for the number of cases identified in this stage and then cured during the 
following three stages of treatment.  The points gained related to the financial incentives paid to 
the hospitals but the metric that relates the points to payment dollars is not described.  Thus we 
were unable to gauge the size of the incentive. 
 
Li et al. (2010) report evidence from all the hospitals that during this period the identification rate 
increased by 30% and the length of treatment for all hospitals was reduced (from 58.3 days to 55.4 
days).  They reported that P4P hospitals had a higher cure rate than non P4P hospitals (68.1% vs. 
48.4%) but did not present data with reference to before and after the scheme was introduced and 
thus as Scott et al. (2011) indicate it is not possible to say whether these changes in cure rates 
were higher for P4P enrolees compared with non P4P hospitals. 
 
This study has a number of methodological weaknesses.  Although improved rates of identification 
and cure have been reported it is not possible to clearly attribute these to the introduction of the 
P4P scheme and as a result the data are suggestive but inconclusive. 
Diabetes 
Lee et al (2010) report on the pay for performance for diabetes care in Taiwan.  This study used a 
retrospective population based natural experiment design with intervention and comparison groups 
to examine the effects of the P4P program in relation to health service utilisation and health care 





A Literature Review on Integrating Quality and Safety into Hospital Pricing Systems   Page 55 
program in 2006 (N = 12,499).  To create a comparison group, all patients since 2001 who had 
never joined the P4P program were identified and then were randomly sampled to form a 
comparison group (N = 26,172).  Comparisons were made of indicators pre intervention (e.g. 2005 
data) and post intervention (e.g. 2006 data) for both groups.  
 
Hospitals and community clinics with physicians qualified in metabolic disorders can voluntarily 
apply to participate in the NHI P4P program.  The participating physicians can then enrol individual 
patients in the program.  On top of the usual reimbursements for health care services, the P4P 
program compensates physicians for ‘enlarged physician fees’ and for case-management fees.  
Case management fees include a) an initial enrolment visit b) comprehensive follow-up visits and 
c) an annual evaluation visit, and there are required and recommended services included in these 
visits (e.g. diabetes specific eye examination, laboratory evaluation, self-care education) as 
outlined in the scheme guidelines.  The actual size of the monetary incentives for participating 
hospitals and clinics was not described. 
 
At baseline (2005) data there was no difference between the groups – the average number of 
essential exams/tests performed in a year were similar across the groups.  After the P4P 
introduction there were increases in the number of tests for both groups but they were much 
greater for the intervention group (p < 0.001).  This was also the case for the number of physician 
visits (p < 0.001).  The average number of hospitalisations for the intervention group increased 
slightly per year (p >0.05) but the increase in hospitalisations for the comparison group was higher 
across the year (p > 0.01).  
 
 As a result there was a much greater increase in cost for physician visits for the intervention group 
(p < 0.001).  However, both groups showed a decrease in inpatient costs but this was far greater 
for the intervention group (p < 0.01).  The total cost of diabetes related health care expenses in 
2006 vs. 2005 were higher for the intervention group - amounting to an additional $104 per patient 
per year. 
 
As previous local studies had reported health services for patients with diabetes to be insufficient, 
the incentive was designed to encourage more regular follow up visits and exams/tests for better 
monitoring and control of diabetes.  The authors conclude that the P4P program effectively 
improved the evidence based service utilisation of enrolled patients and that this, by inference, 
might be expected to improve patient outcomes. 
 
The authors acknowledge the study has several important limitations including the non random 
selection of physicians and patients in the program.  As the physician can select which of their 
patients are enrolled in the program there may be the potential for them to only include ‘easier’ or 
less seriously ill patients.  The possibility arises that the comparison group may have had more 
severe illness.  An analysis of the severity of patients in the intervention and the comparison 
groups was unable to be made using the retrospective service utilisation and the cost data 
available.  However, an analysis of co-morbidity undertaken indicated that the intervention group 
had a higher number of patients with 2 or more co-morbidities.  For age, however, it was found the 
comparison group was significantly older and, in particular, the intervention group had fewer 
patients 71 years or older.  Selection bias thus may cast some doubt on the generalisability of 
these findings. 
 
Chen et al. (2011) in a later study used 2007 data to test whether seriously ill diabetes patients 
were disproportionately excluded from the P4P-DM program in Taiwan and reports evidence that 
older patients, more severe patients and those with more co-morbidities were prone to be 
excluded.  As a result they suggested the importance of mandated participation and risk 
adjustment in P4P programs.  However, it should be noted that there were some changes to the 
Taiwan P4P-DM incentive payment scheme at the end of 2006 making their findings not directly 
comparable with the 2006 data reported by Lee et al. (2010).   
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7.5 Summary of the Evidence – Other International Incentive Schemes 
The following tables summarise the papers and studies reviewed. 
Table 21 Other International Incentive Schemes – details 




Composite Quality Score and 








2010 Report Incentive – bonus 
added to the 
National Tariff 
Price depending 
on the level of 
performance 
Adjusted price England 
Advancing Quality Initiative 
www.advancingqualitynw.nhs.uk 
NHS 2012 Website As above Adjusted price England 
Impact of a pay-for-
performance programme in the 
North West of England on 
patient mortality risk 
Sutton et al. 2011 Conference 




As above Adjusted price England 
Reduced mortality with hospital 
Pay for Performance in England 
Sutton et al. 2012 Journal 
article 
As above Adjusted price England 
Using the Commissioning for 




Dept. Health 2008 Govt. Paper Provider bonus of 
up to 1.5% total 
revenue as in 
standard contract 
with NHS.  
Bonus for 
meeting local 
quality goals & 
some national 
goals for acute 
sector 
England 
CQUIN Impact Review Dept. Health 2008 Govt. Paper As above As above England 
CQUIN Summary Guide 2010 Dept. Health 2010 Govt. Paper As above As above England 
CQUIN 2011/12 Summary Sheet Dept. Health 2011 Govt. Paper Bonus now 2.5% 
of total revenue 
As above England 
Using the Commissioning for 
Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) 
payment framework 
Dept. Health 2012 Govt. Paper As above As above England 
The effects of pay-for –
performance on Tuberculosis 
treatment in Taiwan 
Li et al.  2010 Journal 
article 
Incentive – points 








A Pay-for- Performance 
Program for Diabetes Care in 
Taiwan 











Table 22 Other International Incentive Schemes – focus and context 
Article name Area of focus Context and setting Magnitude of the incentive 
Composite Quality Score and Outcome 




in NW England  
Similar to PHQID scheme in USA 
with larger and broader 
incentives, mandatory 
participation and public reporting 
Substantial incentive 
payment  
Advancing Quality Initiative 
www.advancingqualitynw.nhs.uk 
As above As above Substantial incentive 
payment  
Impact of a pay-for-performance 
programme in the North West of 
England on patient mortality risk 
Evaluation of the 
AQ initiative 
Early evaluation results for AQ As above 
Reduced mortality with hospital Pay for 
Performance in England 
Evaluation of the 
AQ initiative 
Early evaluation results for AQ As above 
Using the Commissioning for Quality 





Strengthening local participation 
in National policy directions for 
quality and safety through the 
ability to address local needs 
Bonus of up to 0.5% of total 
provider revenue 
dependent on participation 
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Article name Area of focus Context and setting Magnitude of the incentive 
with identified 
performance targets 
CQUIN Impact Review Most health 
sectors 
As above As above 
CQUIN Summary Guide 2010 Most health 
sectors 
As above Bonus of up to 1.5% of total 
provider revenue 
dependent on participation 
in local quality initiatives 
with identified 
performance targets 
CQUIN 2011/12 Summary Sheet Most health 
sectors 
As above Bonus of up to 2.5% of total 
revenue dependent on 
participation in local quality 
initiatives with identified 
performance targets 
Using the Commissioning for Quality 




As above As above 
The effects of pay-for –performance on 
Tuberculosis treatment in Taiwan 
Acute and 
ambulatory care 
High incidence of tuberculosis 
compared with other countries 
Unclear 
A Pay-for- Performance Program for 
Diabetes Care in Taiwan 
Acute and 
ambulatory care 




Table 23 Other International Incentive Schemes – results 


















 Process indicators 
and some outcome 
indicators forming a 
Composite Quality 
Score (CQS) 
Shifts occurring in CQS but 
relationship to outcomes 
uncertain. The average 
improvement (%) in the CQS 
scores ranged from 1.45% for 










Website shows CQS 
results for each trust 
over a 3 year period 
and for the scheme 
overall 
As above 
Impact of a pay-for-
performance 
programme in the 
North West of 









and some outcome 
indicators forming a 
Composite Quality 
Score (CQS) and 30 
day in-hospital 
mortality 
Showed reduction in mortality 
for heart failure & pneumonia 
but not for AMI.  However, CQS 
not strongly associated with 
these changes 
Reducing mortality in 










and some outcome 
indicators forming a 
Composite Quality 
Score (CQS) and 30 
day in-hospital 
mortality 
Showed risk adjusted decline of 
1.3% in 30 day for the 3 
conditions combined. The decline 
in mortality for pneumonia was 
also significant but not for AMI 



















-2 national goals for 
acute care 
-Goals, targets and 
indicators specified 
for varying local 
initiatives 
-Global question on 
patient experience 




As above LHN As above As above The  Impact Review is an analysis 
of potential policy impact of the 
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introduction of CQUIN 
CQUIN Summary 
Guide 2010 
As above LHN Mainly 
Public 
As above Although an independent 
evaluation is due to report in 




As above LHN Mainly 
Public 
Added two additional 
national goals – 
improve awareness of 
and diagnosis of 
dementia 
A set of global claims are made 









As above LHN Mainly 
Public 
As above As above 
The effects of pay-for 
–performance on 
Tuberculosis 









Cure rates for TB 
Length of treatment 
Identification of TB 
cases 
Higher cure rate and reduced 
length of treatment for TB after 
implementation of P4P. P4P 
hospitals had a higher cure rate 
than non P4P hospitals 
A Pay-for- 
Performance 
Program for Diabetes 










No. of diabetes 
follow-up visits and 
tests, no. of 
hospitalisations 
More follow-up visits and tests 
for P4P group and fewer 
hospitalisations. Cost increase 
equates to US$ 104 per P4P 
patient 
 
Table 24 Other International Incentives Schemes – key points 
Article name Key points from article Impact Significance 
of impact / 
effects 
Self-reported strength 
of any reported 
improvement 
Composite Quality 
Score and Outcome 
Methodologies Year 
One 
Describes the methodology for 
calculating the hospital quality 
scores (CQS) and general 




for change in CQS 
scores since AQ 
introduction but it 
is unclear how 




Moderate to High -the 
average improvement 
(%) in the CQS scores 
ranged from 1.45% for 






The website provides a range of 
information about this scheme 
including the performance of 
individual trusts over time in 
relation to CQS and for the scheme 
overall 
As above Conclusive - 
positive 
See above 
Impact of a pay-for-
performance 
programme in the 
North West of England 
on patient mortality risk 
Showed small reductions in 
mortality for heart failure & 
pneumonia but not for AMI -520 
deaths averted at bonus cost of 3.2 
million pounds. Found that the CQS 
were not strongly associated with 








Reduction in mortality 
for hospital Pay for 
Performance in England 
Showed a 1.3% reduction in risk 
adjusted 30 day mortality for the 
three conditions but only 











Quality and Innovation 
Description of scheme and its 
background (also user manual) 
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Article name Key points from article Impact Significance 
of impact / 
effects 
Self-reported strength 




CQUIN Summary Guide 
2010 
Guidance for 2011/12 
implementation including updates 
and changes, user resources 
Too early to tell NA NA 
CQUIN 2011/12 
Summary Sheet 
Guidance for 2011/12 
implementation including updates 
and changes, user resources 
(summary). Includes statements 
concerning achievements of the 
scheme 
Unclear Inconclusive High 
Using the 
Commissioning for 
Quality and Innovation 
(CQUIN) payment 
framework (2012) 
Guidance for 2011/12 
implementation including updates 
and changes, user resources 
NA NA NA 




12 month cure rates and length of 
treatment for TB patients in P4P 
program compared with historical 
controls and non P4P hospitals 
Inconclusive due 
to design flaws 
Inconclusive Moderate to High 
A Pay-for- Performance 
Program for Diabetes 
Care in Taiwan 
Costs and service utilisation for 
diabetes patients in P4P program 
vs. control 
Inconclusive Inconclusive Moderate 
 
Table 25 Other International Incentive Schemes – evidence and applicability 
Article name Evidence of 
service/system change 
Comments Overall applicability to 
Australia and to IHPA for ABF 
purposes 
Composite Quality Score and 
Outcome Methodologies Year 
One 
Yes over 3 year period Some methodological issues 
relating to the calculation of CQS 
need to be explored. Further 
evaluation data are required 
Yes with caveats concerning 
some methodological issues 
and need for further 
evaluation data. 
Advancing Quality Initiative 
www.advancingqualitynw.nhs.uk 
As above As above Yes - As above 
Impact of a pay-for-
performance programme in 
the North West of England on 
patient mortality risk 
Yes over a 12 month 
period 
As above Yes - As above 
Reduction in mortality in 
hospital Pay for Performance in 
England 
Yes over an 18 month 
period 
As above Yes – As above 
Using the Commissioning for 
Quality and Innovation 
(CQUIN) payment framework    
NA – background 
documents 
Some lack of clarity concerning 
payment and incentive 
mechanisms 
NA – background document 
CQUIN Impact Review (2008) As above As above As above 
CQUIN Summary Guide 2010 Not at this time As above No results provided at this 
time 
CQUIN 2011/12 Summary 
Sheet 
A summary of 
(unsubstantiated) claims 
concerning 
achievements since 2009 
Some lack of clarity concerning 
payment and incentive 
mechanisms 
Unclear as no evidence 
available as yet to 
substantiate initial claims of 
improvement. Claims relate 




Using the Commissioning for 
Quality and Innovation 
(CQUIN) payment framework 
(2012) 
NA NA-a briefing manual concerning 
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Article name Evidence of 
service/system change 
Comments Overall applicability to 
Australia and to IHPA for ABF 
purposes 
The effects of pay-for –
performance on Tuberculosis 
treatment in Taiwan 
Yes – over 1 year period 
post introduction of P4P 
A number of design issues. No 
severity adjustment when 
comparing outcomes by type of 
hospital. 
No – details of incentives are 
unclear and health system 
characteristics appear to be 
quite different to Australia 
A Pay-for- Performance 
Program for Diabetes Care in 
Taiwan 
Yes – over 1 year period 
post introduction of P4P 
Increased service utilisation is a 
desired outcome but is 
associated with a small increased 
per patient cost. Increase in 
follow-up care is seen as a proxy 
for quality and patient outcome 
No – details of incentives are 
unclear and health system 
characteristics appear to be 
quite different to Australia 
7.6 Conclusion: Other International Incentive Schemes 
The Advancing Quality initiative in the NW of England, which is quite similar to the PHQID scheme 
outlined in Section 7.1, has the most evidence.  However for the NW scheme participation is 
mandatory vs. voluntary for this area and the incentives paid are larger and apply to more 
hospitals (50% vs. 20%).  There is limited evaluation data available but the limited evaluation data 
are suggestive of a positive effect in terms of both shifts in hospital quality scores for the clinical 
areas and outcomes such as short term mortality rates.  Accordingly, this scheme warrants further 
investigation.  
 
Similarly, the Queensland CPIP scheme in Australia (refer Section 8) has shown some indications 
of a positive effect in some areas such as mental health.  However, there are limited evaluation 
data available in the public domain as yet. 
 
Claims are made concerning the CQUIN initiative in England but the summary of results provided 
does not include any actual or verifiable evidence.  An independent evaluation of this scheme is 
currently due. 
 
The studies from Taiwan report various positive effects but attribution is uncertain given study 
design issues and selection bias factors. 
 
However, given the state of the evidence, a review paper on incentive systems (Glasziou et al. 
2012) recently identified 9 key questions that need to be asked before the introduction of any 
incentive scheme designed to change clinician behaviour.  These include: 
 
Part A: Is a financial incentive appropriate? 
 Does the desired clinical action improve patient outcomes? 
 Will undesirable clinical behaviour persist without intervention? 
 Are there valid, reliable and practical measures for the desired clinical behaviour? 
 Have the barriers and enablers to improving clinical behaviour been assessed? 
 Will financial incentives work and better than other interventions to change 
behaviour, and why? 
 Will benefits clearly outweigh any unintended harmful effects, and at an acceptable 
cost? 
 
Part B: Implementation 
 Are systems and structures needed for the change in place? 
 How much should be paid to whom, and for how long? 
 How will the incentives be delivered? 
 
Appleby et al. (2012) indicate the same factors should be considered at a system level when 
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7.7 Disincentive Models: Penalties for Poor Practice 
Disincentives are included as a component in some funding models that also include incentives, 
such as pay for performance and normative pricing.  Examples were described previously in some 
of the US initiatives.  Primarily, disincentives are based on outcomes of care, and the measures 
used include hospital readmissions, hospital acquired conditions (HACs), and low rankings on 
composite quality scores.  As can be seen from the summary tables below (Section 7.9) there is 
no evidence of the specific effects of disincentive models as they are either a minor component of 
a broader strategy (such as in PHQID), or are in the early stages of implementation or still in 
development. 
 
Hospital readmissions within 30 days of discharge have been identified as a large and potentially 
preventable cost (Kocher and Adashi 2011) and have been specifically addressed in the US 
Patient Protection and the Affordable Care Act.  The US will be implementing the Hospital 
Readmission Reduction Program in 2013 which will apply penalties based on an outcome 
measure of a 30 day excess readmission ratio, initially for acute myocardial infarction, heart failure 
and pneumonia, and then expanding to include other conditions.  
 
Use of disincentives by withholding or reducing payment for HACs is clearly complex due to the 
difficulty in attributing these events to the care provided with absolute certainty.  As noted by Fuller 
et al. (2011) the implication is that HACs are always preventable, and therefore the number of 
conditions can be limited.  In addition to being preventable, the complications must be measurable 
(Pronovost et al., 2008).  In the narrowest model, only those that can be classified as ‘never 
events’ are included, such as wrong patient/site surgery and foreign object retained after surgery.  
An example of this is the NHS Payment by Results scheme in the UK which includes a list of 
‘Never events’, which are defined as ‘largely preventable’ and paid at the discretion of the 
commissioners (Dept. Health 2011) (refer Appendix 2).  
 
As part of their Healthcare Purchasing Framework, Queensland Health has identified six ‘Never 
events’, that will receive no payment, and additionally two adverse events that will result in a 
reduction in payment (see Section 8.1.2 and 8.3; Steele and Wright, 2012). 
 
The Acute Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) in the US has also expanded from only 
using ‘never events’, including conditions that ‘could reasonably have been prevented through the 
application of evidence-based guidelines’ (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2012).  
This includes some surgical site and catheter associated infections (refer Appendix 2).   
 
A consideration of a disincentive strategy using HACs is the collection and reporting of reliable 
data.  As discussed by Zhan et al. (2007) there can be inconsistencies in the assigning of ‘present 
on admission’ ((POA) codes, (or ‘Condition Onset Flags’, (COFs) as they are called in the 
Australian setting (AIHW, 2012)), which can be used to identify HACs.  Therefore, ensuring 
accurate and complete clinical documentation, code assignment, and reporting for both COF and 
the conditions arising, presents a challenge. 
 
As outlined previously, a penalty for poor performance, or ‘payment adjustment’, was part of the 
PHQID in the US, where hospitals that ranked in the lower two deciles at the end of the third year 
could be penalised 1% to 2% of their Medicare reimbursement for that condition (Davidson et al., 
2007).  However, much of the literature on the PHQID focuses on the incentive aspect of this 
program and the extent or impact of the penalties is not known. 
7.8 Summary of the Evidence on Disincentives 
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Table 26 Disincentive Models - details 









Zhan, C et al. 2007 Research 
study 

















2012 Fact Sheet Disincentives - IPPS Adjusted price USA 
A New Approach 
to Reducing 
Payments Made 
















Rosenthal, M 2007 Article  Disincentives - IPPS Adjusted price USA 
The Wisdom and 

















and Adashi, E 
2011 Journal article  Disincentives – various 
initiatives mandated by 
the US Patient Protection 
and Affordable care Act 
(ACA) 








2009 Essay  Disincentives Negation/withhold  Canada 
Table 27 Disincentive Models - focus and context 
Article name Area of focus Context and setting Magnitude of the disincentive 
Modifying DRG-PPS to 
Include Only Diagnoses 
Present on Admission 
Acute inpatient Inconsistent use of POA coding in US.  Predicted an $800 million saving 
nationwide 
Hospital-Acquired 
Conditions (HAC) in Acute 
Inpatient Prospective 
Payment System (IPPS) 
Hospitals 
Acute inpatient List of HAC codes updated for FY 
2011 for IPPS. 
Payment does not include cases that 
are acquired during hospitalisation. 
A New Approach to 
Reducing Payments Made to 
Hospitals with High 
Complication Rates 
Acute inpatient Review of IPPS As above 
Nonpayment for 
Performance?  Medicare's 
New Reimbursement Rule 
Acute inpatient Prior to implement of IPPS As above 
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Article name Area of focus Context and setting Magnitude of the disincentive 
Not Paying for "Preventable 
Complications" 
Hospital Readmissions and 
the Affordable care Act  
Acute care Initiatives as outcomes of the US 
Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) 
Aiming to reduce hospital 
readmission rates by 20% by the end 
of 2013 with a potential saving of 
$15 billion.  
Healthcare-Associated 
Infections as Patient Safety 
Indicators 
Acute care Increasing use of national patient 
safety initiatives, including 
healthcare-associated infections 
(HAIs) in driving quality healthcare. 
Not applicable 
Table 28 Disincentive Models - results 
Article name Strength of 
evidence 
Health system level Sector Quality/Safety 
measurement 
Results  
Modifying DRG-PPS to 
Include Only Diagnoses 














Status of conditions 
as present on 
admission or arising 
during admission.  
Stated that Medicare 
could have saved $56 
million in California, 
$51 million in New 
York, and $800 million 
nationwide in 2003 
had it paid hospital 
claims based only on 
POA diagnoses. Some 
problems in coding 
POA were identified.  
Hospital-Acquired 
Conditions (HAC) in 
Acute Inpatient 
Prospective Payment 
System (IPPS) Hospitals 
NA Hospitals (under the 
Inpatient Prospective 
Payment System (IPPS) 
Public Hospital acquired 
condition codes 
NA 
A New Approach to 
Reducing Payments 





Hospital or similar  Public Hospital acquired 
condition codes 
A payment reduction 
based on a best 
practice norm would 
be sufficient to lower 
overall hospital 
payments by 8.14% 
while still providing 
additional payment to 






NA Hospital Public Hospital acquired 
condition codes 
NA 
The Wisdom and Justice 





















Various NA Hospital acquired 
infection rates 
NA 
Table 29 Disincentive Models - key points 
Article name Key points from article Impact Significance 
of impact / 
effects 
Self-reported 
strength of any 
reported 
improvement 
Modifying DRG-PPS to 
Include Only 
Use of POA codes to reduce payment could result in 
substantial savings for Medicare, in addition to resulting 
NA NA NA 
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Article name Key points from article Impact Significance 
of impact / 
effects 
Self-reported 
strength of any 
reported 
improvement 
Diagnoses Present on 
Admission 
in more useful data for quality and safety research. 
Hospital-Acquired 





NA NA  NA NA  
A New Approach to 
Reducing Payments 
Made to Hospitals 
with High 
Complication Rates 
Always excluding HACs implies these conditions are 
always preventable, thus limiting the complications that 
can be included. List of HAC codes could be broadened 
using POA codes and a risk-adjusted best practice norm 
which could then target hospitals with excessive rates of 
‘potentially preventable complications’. 










Excluding HAC codes from DRGs will not impact where 
there are other additional factors that cause a case to be 
assigned into a more expensive DRG. Conditions 
included are very limited due to a lack of risk adjustment 
in the model. Notes a lack of empirical support.  
NA NA NA 
The Wisdom and 
Justice of Not Paying 
for "Preventable 
Complications" 
Broadening the list of HOA codes to other complications 
is complex as there must be certainty that they are 
important, measurable and truly preventable. Model 
should be used to stimulate quality improvement and 
reduce costs. Benefits and risks should be evaluated 
following implementation. 
NA  NA NA 
Hospital 
Readmissions and the 
Affordable care Act  
Reducing hospital readmission rates is a major focus of 
the US Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
and is considered an example of quality of care 
improvement. Various strategies using both financial 
incentives and penalties are to be implemented 
including applying penalties to excess readmission ratios. 
NA NA NA 
Healthcare-
Associated Infections 
as Patient Safety 
Indicators 
HAIs are gaining significance as a patient safety indicator 
of quality healthcare. HAI rates could be incorporated 
into accountability agreements such as those that exist 
currently for Ontario hospitals, with a focus on facilities 
that have ongoing unacceptable rates of HAIs due to 
noncompliance with validated strategies.  
NA NA NA 
 
Table 30 Disincentive Models - evidence and applicability 
Article name Evidence of 
service/system 
change 
Comments Overall applicability to 
Australia and to IHPA for 
ABF purposes 
Modifying DRG-PPS to 
Include Only Diagnoses 
Present on Admission 
NA Article is from 2007, POA coding has since 
been implemented nationally and a non-pay 
for non-performance system essentially 
operates, with further penalties to be 
introduced next year. Model is not risk 
adjusted. 
Yes – with caveats. (Article 
published prior to the 
implementation of the HAC 
and POA Indicator. 
Reporting uses data from 
2003 – for discussion only 
Hospital-Acquired 
Conditions (HAC) in 
Acute Inpatient 
Prospective Payment 
System (IPPS) Hospitals 
NA Fact sheet only No (fact sheet for 
information) 
A New Approach to 
Reducing Payments 
Made to Hospitals with 
High Complication 
Rates 
NA Model provides a 'disincentive' against 
excessive poor performance.  Also encourages 
hospitals to benchmark quality performance 
against their peers. 
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Article name Evidence of 
service/system 
change 
Comments Overall applicability to 






NA Opinion piece only identifying issues with the 
use of non risk adjusted HAC codes. 
No 
The Wisdom and 
Justice of Not Paying 
for "Preventable 
Complications" 
NA Opinion piece only identifying issues with the 
limitations on classifying conditions as 
‘preventable’. 
No (for discussion only) 
Hospital Readmissions 
and the Affordable 
care Act  
NA Strategies not yet implemented No 
Healthcare-Associated 
Infections as Patient 
Safety Indicators 
NA Broad discussion about HAIs and possible 
strategies for reducing HAI numbers. 
No (for discussion only)  
7.9 Conclusion: Disincentive Models 
Use of financial disincentives to drive quality/safety improvement appears to be gaining 
momentum.  However, as can be seen from the summary tables (Section 7.8) these models have 
only recently been implemented or are still in development stages and there is currently no 
evidence regarding the outcomes of this approach. 
 
It is clear, however, that penalising poor performance is increasingly being used as a part of a 
comprehensive funding model, which may also provide incentive funding for discharge planning 
and care, and quality improvement programs.  The Medicare model in the US is an example of this 
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8 The Australian Experience 
This chapter draws together the evidence on the Australian experience in linking quality and safety 
to funding and pricing.  This experience includes the models discussed in the previous chapters 
such as best practice pricing, normative pricing, quality structures pricing models and Payment for 
Performance (P4P).   
 
 
This chapter on the Australian experience includes a description of Australian models that have 
been implemented but not evaluated.  It also includes Australian models that are proposed in the 
early phases of implementation and where it is too early to assess impact. 
8.1 Queensland Health 
Queensland Health is currently in the process of introducing a number of normative strategies for 
incentivising day case surgery and reducing length of stay.  A range of DRGs will be funded at a 
price as if they were undertaken as a day case or an extended day case (Steele and Wright, 
2012).  Lists have been identified based on current Queensland practice and targets have been 
set.  It is planned to eliminate unnecessary pre-operative bed days by not funding bed days for 
elective surgery in the outlier period to a value equivalent to any pre-operative bed days (Steele 
and Wright, 2012).  
8.1.1 Clinical Practice Improvement Payment System (CPIP) 
Following the introduction of casemix payment for hospitals in 2007, the Clinical Practice 
Improvement Program was introduced in Queensland, Australia in 2008 and this provides 
incentive payments for clinical improvement activities.  The provision of incentive payments is 
largely related to achieving performance for which there is a set of safety and quality indicators.  In 
2008, during a pilot phase, seven process indicators were introduced for a range of clinical areas 
including mental health (2), stroke (2), emergency department (1), discharge medication for 
patients (1) and chronic pulmonary obstructive disease (1) (Duckett et al., 2008).  These indicators 
were developed in consultation and collaboration with clinical networks. 
 
The indicators focussed on areas such as continuity of care, prescribing and recording of 
medication and assessment.  The initial indicators were largely process measures.  For example, 
they include such elements as patients with a DRG of schizophrenia being seen by a community 
mental health professional within 7 days following discharge; patients with acute ischaemic stroke 
receiving antiplatelet medication within 48 hours; an eLMS Discharge Medication Record (or 
equivalent form for Residential Aged Care) being completed; and for COPD patients in receipt of a 
Pulmonary Rehabilitation program which meets a recommended evidence based standard. In 
2010 the indicators were reviewed and expanded to 10 indicators.  There were new indicators for 
diabetes (1) intensive care (1) maternity (3) and renal (2) and one of the stroke indicators was 
removed (Scott et al., 2011). 
 
In 2011 (Queensland Health, 2012) new indicators for 2011-2012 were added across a range of 
new areas including cancer, pressure injury reporting and radiology; additional indicators have 
been added for some areas (e.g. respiratory conditions) and some existing indicators were refined 
or replaced.  There now appear to be over 30 indicators and the scheme is set to continue until 
2013 (Stockwell, 2010). 
 
Since 2008 Queensland Health has dedicated around 1% of its hospital expenditure to the pilot 
scheme representing about $8 million each year.  Payments are currently made per indicator with 
an annual cap for each indicator.  For example, for each patient with a diagnosis of cancer who 
receives a multidisciplinary review and for whom the agreed minimum dataset has been completed 
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The evaluation of the Phase 1 implementation of this scheme is reported in a doctoral thesis by 
Stockwell (2010) which is available on the internet (eprints.qut.edu.au/42427/1/Alexis_Stockwell_Thesis_.pdf).  
 
This thesis examined the implementation of the scheme from January 2008 until March 2009.  A 
clinician survey (with a 62% response rate) indicated that 73% of clinicians felt the scheme should 
continue and was useful.  Other data provided by Stockwell (2010) indicated, however, that most 
clinicians only had a moderate degree of knowledge about the scheme.  
 
The incentive payments were made to the District Health Service and then were to be passed on 
to the relevant clinical areas.  The survey indicated that only 37% of the clinicians thought they had 
received the incentive payment for achieving the specified performance.  A main issue of 
contention was that although the District Health Service might receive the funds it was thought that 
these were not being passed down to the relevant clinical areas.  
 
As a result the business rules for the scheme were revised to address this issue.  More recent 
trend data could not be located and it would be interesting to see whether this resulted in 
increased achievement of the indicators in Phases 2 (April 2009 –September 2010) and 3 
(October 2010-2013). 
 
Another issue of concern for clinicians was that at the start of the scheme there was no level 
playing field so that areas that already had better resources would not find the reporting 
requirements difficult to achieve and thus would be more likely to meet the reporting targets and to 
gain the incentive payments.  The data from Stockwell (2010) indicated that in the initial phase 
hospitals in the metropolitan and SE of Queensland were receiving more incentive funding than 
rural and remote areas.  
 
Stockwell (2010) also examined the initial trend data from January to September 2008 which was 
compared to pre-implementation data collected in 2007 prior to the introduction of the scheme. 
There were some significant data issues such as no or limited baseline data for some indicators.  
 
For those areas where there were adequate baseline data, the improvement in the indicators was 
modest and ranged from 5% for the discharge medication indicator to 10% for the Mental Health 
indicator.  Stockwell (2010) notes that Mental Health incentive payments of $397,050 were made 
during the period whereas the costs for reporting and analysing the indicator were estimated at 
$7,346.  The benefit earned, minus cost, was reportedly $389,703. 
 
Plever et al. (2012) examined data for 16 Mental Health Services participating in the CPIP scheme 
from January 2009 – June 2011.  State wide results showed steady and continual improvement on 
the mental health indicator (Schizophrenia post discharge 1-7 day follow-up) with an increase in 
state-wide averages from 39% to 62% in two and a half years.  In terms of the trajectory of 
improvement greater gains occurred in the latter half of 2010 despite a brief dip associated with a 
natural disaster during this period.  
 
A minimum target for services to be achieved was introduced at this time.  CPIP funding could not 
be secured until this minimum target was met.  However, given contextual factors the authors 
conclude that it is unlikely that incentive payments, with or without targets, were totally responsible 
for improvement in the follow-up indicator.  For example, the Mental Health Clinical Collaborative 
introduced a state-wide service improvement methodology over the same period.  
 
A more recent draft PowerPoint presentation (Steele and Wright, 2012) to be given to a Finance 
Network Forum was provided to us by Queensland Health.  This identifies some non-recurrent 
increase in ABF funding for Quality Improvement Payments (QIP).  The targets relate to elective 
surgery (patients seen within clinically recommended timescales); time from admission to theatre 
for patients admitted as an emergency for repair of fractured neck of femur, ED patient’s length of 
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Queensland Health also has a commitment to monitoring patient experience and they undertook 
an Emergency Department Survey (http://www.health.qld.gov.au/psq/hemt/webpages/patsat_emerg.asp) 
focussing on what occurred (e.g. how long the patient waited, information concerning the reasons 
they were given for waiting etc.) rather than just overall patient satisfaction. 
8.1.2 Queensland and other disincentive models 
As part of their Healthcare Purchasing Framework, Queensland Health has identified six ‘Never 
events’, that will receive no payment, and additionally two adverse events that will result in a 
reduction in payment (Steele and Wright, 2012).   
 
A simulation study (McNair et al., 2009) in Victoria examined the potential effects of a redistribution 
of DRG payments between discharges with hospital acquired infections and those without.  This 
showed that this strategy had the potential to provide higher rewards for hospitals that had fewer 
hospital acquired diagnoses - but this has not, as yet, been implemented.  
8.2 Western Australia 
Since 2010-2011 the Western Australian Health Department has been progressively implementing 
Activity Based Funding for funding acute in-patient episodes in hospitals.  In 2011-2012 the out-
patient work stream was added to ABF and it is proposed this will include sub-acute care, mental 
health and other non-admitted services such as community services by 2013-2014 (HAPI, 2012).  
They have established a State Efficient Price (SEP) for hospitals. 
 
A number of quality/safety initiatives have been introduced within this context. In 2011-2012 the 
Safety and Quality Investment for Reform (SQuIRE) was introduced which dedicated $8m per 
annum of recurrent funding to assist Health Services to: 
 
1. Continue to develop and maintain clinical governance systems and processes; 
2. Incorporate safety and quality activities into permanent roles; 
3. Continue to roll out the eight evidence-based clinical practice improvement (CPI) initiatives 
(venous embolism, pressure ulcers; AMI, falls prevention, medication reconciliation, surgical 
site infections, central venous catheter infections and hand hygiene) 
4. Implement State and National safety and quality policies and programs, including those 
initiatives developed by the Commission and endorsed by the Standing Council on Health 
(SCoH); and 
5. Continue existing clinical governance activity and reporting arrangements 
 
Basically this initiative provides funding to implement the relevant quality and safety policies and to 
report on a range of indicators related to these initiatives (refer point 4 above).  
 
Another initiative is the QuIP Clinical Improvement Integration Program (QuIP CIIP) where a 
funding pool has been established for allocation of project grants to accelerate the uptake and 
spread of innovative ABF/ABM reforms within WA. 
 
In 2012-2013 (HAPI, 2012) a performance-based Premium Payment Program for WA Health 
Services will be introduced to: 
 
 Recognise and reward services which provide a very high level of best evidence-based care; 
 Reimburse service providers for any additional costs associated with best evidence-based 
care; and 
 Reimburse service providers for the additional tasks required to participate in the scheme, 
including the collection and submission of data. 
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 A strong evidence base and clinical consensus on the characteristics of best practice; 
 High impact, i.e. variation in practice, gap between best evidence and current practice, high 
volumes or significant impact on outcomes; and 
 Availability and quality of data. 
 
In the initial year five (2014-2015) payments will be trialled, using both a reimbursement for care 
planning incentive model and a quality bonus incentive model.  The clinical areas include fragility 
hip fracture, stroke, adult central line associated bloodstream infections and healthcare associated 
staphylococcus aureus bloodstream infection.  Participation in the program initially will not be 
mandatory but sites and services will be eligible for payment only if they submit the required data 
on the key indicators.  Some aspects of this proposal could be considered as fitting the Best 
Practice Pricing Model.  For example, the fragility hip fracture premium payment has been based 
on the United Kingdom’s Payment by Results Best Practice Tariff program (Department of Health, 
2011).  
8.3 Summary of Australian Models 
Table 31 Australian Models - details 















with day case surgery. 
Withholding payment for 
some pre-operative day 







Pay for performance in 
Australia: Queensland’s 
new Clinical Practice 
Improvement Payment 
Duckett et al. 2008 Journal article Incentives paid to 
hospitals (@ $50-100 per 
patient) related to the 
achievement of clinical 
process /reporting 
indicators 
Adjusted price Aus 
CHI Clinical practice 
improvement CPIP user 
guide Phase 111 
Queensland 
Health 
2011 Govt. Paper As above but including 
additional indicators 
Adjusted price Aus 
Evaluation of Financial 
Incentives in the Public 
Hospital Context 




for delivery of quality of 
care 
Plever et al. 2012 Journal article Incentive -CPIP Adjusted price Aus 
Designing incentives for 
good-quality hospital 
care 
Duckett, S 2012 Journal article  Disincentives 
(predominantly) 
Adjusted price  Australia  







K, Wakefield, J, 




2012 Letter to 
Editor in MJA  
Disincentives/Incentives  
-  also describes extra 
quality improvement 
payment over ABF which 











the aim of 
improving 
safety and 




Page 70                                              A Literature Review on Integrating Quality and Safety into Hospital Pricing Systems  













ABF and proposed 
reforms including quality 







best practice in ABF and 





ABF and payment reform Various  Australia 
Prospective Payment to 
Encourage System Wide 
Quality Improvement 
McNair, P et al 2009 Research 
study 
Disincentives - IPPS Adjusted price Australia 
Table 32 Australian Models - focus and context  
Article name Area of focus Context and setting Magnitude of the incentive 







Broader issue of State 
budget issues 
Proposed incentive to increase day surgery 
procedures and to reduce pre-operative stays 
Pay for performance in 
Australia: Queensland’s 
new Clinical Practice 
Improvement Payment 
Mainly acute care Following reviews of 
Queensland Health Dept. 
related to regional hospital 
care issues 
Payment rates at @ $50 -$100 per patient 
represent an increase in marginal revenue of 
@ 1-3% per patient treated 
CHI Clinical practice 
improvement CPIP User 
Guide Phase 111 
Mainly acute care As above 
 
Vary by indicator e.g. $50 but with a cap per 
each indicator (e.g. $300,000). Total funds 
available are 8 million per annum 
Evaluation of Financial 
Incentives in the Public 
Hospital Context… 




for delivery of quality of 
care 
Acute mental 
health care and 
outpatient follow-
up 
-Minimum target setting 
introduced 2010 




Payment tariffs ranged from $125 to $200 per 
patient with schizophrenia for follow-up post-
discharge within 7 days. (January 2009 to June 
2011) 
Designing incentives for 
good-quality hospital 
care 
Acute inpatient Introduction of ABF in 
Australia following the 
National Health Reform 
agreement and formation 
of the Independent Hospital 
Pricing Authority (IHPA) 
Offers several options for which the magnitude 
of incentive/disincentive varies 






Acute inpatient Qld Health model No payment under ABF for ‘Never events’, or 
low frequency events associated with severe 
harm or death with very high preventability 
with existing controls. Discounted payment for 
other events with mid to high level 
preventability. Some incentive payment is 




Acute inpatient and 
outpatient 
Ongoing implementation of 
ABF in WA 




best practice in ABF and 
future payment reform 




Prospective Payment to 
Encourage System Wide 
Quality Improvement 
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Table 33 Australian Models - results  
















Public Day surgery rates;  
Pre-operative stay rates 
Specified ‘never’ and 
‘adverse events’ 
Proposed – no evaluation 
Pay for performance in 
Australia: Queensland’s 









7 process indicators 
focussing on areas such 
as continuity of care, 
prescribing and 
recording of medication 
and assessment across 
a range of clinical areas 
No evidence of impact at this 
time e.g. at scheme 
commencement 
CHI Clinical practice 
improvement CPIP User 







As above – additional 
indicators added over 
time 
No independent evaluation 
report identified for post March 
2009. More recent performance 
of the Scheme would be of 
interest 
Evaluation of Financial 











Clinician acceptance of the 
scheme was good. Modest 
increases in reporting for some 
indicators of 5-10% over 9 
months. Comparative baseline 
data not available all areas. 
Issues concerning clinical areas 
not receiving the incentive 
payments as intended from the 












Mental Health process 
measure re follow-up 
post discharge for 
Schizophrenia 
An increase in state-wide 
averages from 39%-62% over 2.5 
years. Cannot be attributed solely  
to incentive intervention 













Public  ‘Never event’ and other 





























NA LHD Public Performance indicators 





best practice in ABF and 
future payment reform 
NA Various Public Various NA 
Prospective Payment to 








to LHN or 
similar) 
Public Not-present-on-
admission and other 
complication diagnoses 
codes 
Excluding specific complication 
codes resulted in 1.37% being 
ungroupable, 1.56% being 
grouped to another DRG and 
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Table 34 Australian Models - key points 
Article name Key points from article Impact Significance 
of impact / 
effects 
Self-reported strength 







Describes a proposed adjusted price 
incentive to increase day surgery rates 
and reduce pre-operative stay rates and 
withholding for never events and adverse 
events 









Description of the development of the 
Queensland CPIP program 






CPIP User Guide 
Phase 111 
Provides background on and definition of 
indicators – particularly those recently 
introduced 
NA NA NA 
Evaluation of 
Financial 
Incentives in the 
Public Hospital 
Context 
Only applies to 9 months of the initial 
implementation of the scheme 
Some modest improvements (5-10%) in 
reporting for some indicators 
Clinicians quite positive but not fully 
engaged 
Inconclusive – but 










delivery of quality 
of care 
Performance of Mental Health Services in 
Queensland in relation to incentivised 
indicator relating to follow-up within 7 










Increasing focus on use of financial 
disincentives to discourage poor quality 
patient care. Payments should not be 
withheld for readmissions in Australia 
due to difficulty in attribution. US list of 
hospital acquired conditions (HAC) could 
be used, or preferably develop a list 
based on The Commission’s standards. 
Excluding HACs from the DRG 
classification could penalise hospitals 
with a higher rate of HACs, reward those 
with low rates and have no impact on 
hospitals with average rates. 
NA NA NA 
Letter to the 







QLD Health in addition to ABF applies a 
'purchasing framework model' to 
improve safety and quality for same or 
lower cost.  





Proposed plans for incentivising quality 
and safety within ABF in WA 





practice in ABF 
While P4P is generally still in 
development, non-payment for non-
performance is moving into 
implementation. Conditions can range 
from ‘never events’ to a braid range of 
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Article name Key points from article Impact Significance 
of impact / 
effects 
Self-reported strength 




conditions, and payment impacts range 
from impacting DRG assignment to 
applying penalties to a broader range of 
cases. The US Medicare payment system 
excludes a list of HACs from the activity-







Case mix based IPPS without exclusions 
for avoidable complications do not 
provide incentives to improve quality. 
NA NA NA 
Table 35 Australian Models - evidence and applicability 
Article name Evidence of service/system 
change 
Comments Overall applicability to 
Australia and to IHPA for ABF 
purposes 
ABF and Queensland 
Healthcare Purchasing 
Framework 
NA-proposed NA Proposed so no evaluation as 
yet 
Pay for performance in 
Australia: Queensland’s 
new Clinical Practice 
Improvement Payment 
NA –refers to development and 
initial implementation phase 
Many indicators are pay for 
reporting although some 
indicators may be more outcome 
related 
Unclear as no substantive 
evidence reported as yet 
CHI Clinical practice 
improvement CPIP User 
Guide Phase III 
NA NA – user manual provides 
details of additional indicators 
No current evaluation data 
available 
Evaluation of Financial 
Incentives in the Public 
Hospital Context 
Yes – short term and minor Identifies some useful 
implementation issues for  
incentive style schemes 
Yes with caveats concerning 





for delivery of quality 
of care 
Yes over 2.5 year period Some unavoidable weaknesses in 
design (field experiment) make 
clear attribution difficult 
Yes with caveats concerning 
study design 
Designing incentives for 
good-quality hospital 
care 
NA Opinion piece offering a proposal 
for a disincentive model of 
penalising for hospital acquired 
conditions. 
No 






No evidence, anecdotal letter 
to editor 
QLD appear committed to paying 
for quality/safety and describe a 
payment model that has 
components of not paying or 
reducing payment for poor 
outcomes and also a quality 
improvement payment above 
ABF as a short term financial 
incentive. 
Apparently being used in QLD 
but not enough detail to 





NA Proposed activities including the 
introduction of some Best 
Practice Tariffs 




best practice in ABF and 
future payment reform 
NA Literature review including 
information about disincentives 
Yes 
Prospective Payment to 
Encourage System Wide 
Quality Improvement 
NA Proposed model penalises at the 
hospital level, therefore is not 
applicable at the national level. 
Yes – with caveats. 
Simulation study only. 
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9 Summary and Conclusions 
There is a rich literature arguing the case that health care pricing models should reward quality 
and safety.  Many of these arguments may be perceived as inherently appealing.  However, while 
strong on argument, most of the literature is weak on evidence. 
 
There is currently limited evaluation or published research data to support Best Practice Pricing. 
The few research studies report modest gains or a beset with methodological inadequacies 
(Casale et al., 2007; Kuo et al., 2011; Nahra et al., 2006).  The most major scheme is the 
introduction of Best Practice Tariffs in England.  Some initial findings from the National Hip 
Fracture Database in the UK (National Hip Fracture Database, 2012) show some improvements 
but there needs to be conclusive evidence that this approach is actually delivering meaningful 
gains in both safety and quality and that the scheme represents value for money in comparison to 
other potential incentive initiatives. 
 
There is limited published data concerning the Normative pricing approaches.  The use of 
normative approach by the National Health Service (UK) to incentivise day surgery procedures is 
yet to be evaluated.  Queensland Health is proposing to introduce a similar strategy in 2012-2013 
(Steele and Wright, 2012) and there are a number of new US initiatives to reduce readmissions 
and to provide greater home based care but these are only at their initial stages and will need to 
be evaluated.  Some research studies examining normative approaches in the radiology area have 
reported substantial improvements in performance (Andriole et al., 2010; Boland et al., 2010) 
although due to weaknesses in the research design the level of evidence is weak. 
 
With regard to Quality Pricing Structures the most common approaches are accreditation, clinical 
quality registries linked to clinical benchmarking and other quality/safety improvement activities 
and the funding approach involves paying for participation in such activities.  The most evidence 
for these approaches is to provide funding to allow clinical services to participate in clinical quality 
registries linked to clinical benchmarking (Birkmeyer and Birkmeyer, 2006; McNeil et al., 2010; 
Share et al., 2011).  The evidence for this approach is strong in terms of achieving improvements 
in quality and safety.  However, there is no direct evidence on the links between performance and 
the level of funding.  Powell et al. (2008) note the lack of studies concerning cost effectiveness 
although the more recent study by Share et al. (2011) reports impressive savings for a clinical 
collaborative in Michigan although the cost for the initiative was also high.  
 
With regard to incentive or pay-for performance schemes while there have been many research 
studies conducted on the Premier Hospital Quality lncentive Demonstration (PHQID) project in the 
USA there is no convincing evidence that demonstrates any beneficial outcomes that can be 
attributed to the program (Jha et al., 2012; Ryan 2009a).  The most recent study (Jha et al., 2012) 
is the most definitive.  It found no impact on patient outcomes for hospitals in the Premier pay-for-
performance program compared with non-Premier hospitals.  Thus, participation in the pay-for-
performance was not associated with a decline in mortality above and beyond those reported for 
hospitals that participated in public reporting alone.  No difference was found in outcomes even for 
conditions in which mortality rates were explicitly incentivised.   
 
The Advancing Quality Initiative in England (see page 50) shows greater evidence concerning the 
reduction in short-term in-hospital mortality and improvement in hospital quality scores (Sutton et 
al., 2011; 2012).  Some models implemented in other countries and locally also show some 
evidence but require more rigorous evaluation.   
 
However, given the state of the evidence, a review paper on incentive systems (Glasziou et al., 
2012) recently identified 9 key questions that need to be asked before the introduction of any 
incentive scheme designed to change clinician behaviour. These include: 
 
Part A: Is a financial incentive appropriate? 
 Does the desired clinical action improve patient outcomes? 
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 Are there valid, reliable and practical measures for the desired clinical behaviour 
 Have the barriers and enablers to improving clinical behaviour been assessed? 
 Will financial incentives work and better than other interventions to change 
behaviour, and why? 
 Will benefits clearly outweigh any unintended harmful effects, and at an acceptable 
cost? 
 
Part B: Implementation 
 Are systems and structures needed for the change in place? 
 How much should be paid to whom, and for how long? 
 How will the incentives be delivered? 
 
Appleby et al. (2012) indicate the same factors should be considered at a system level when 
considering the introduction of payment by results schemes. Many of these issues also apply 
equally well to the other models discussed including the imposition of disincentives.  
 
Use of financial disincentives to drive quality/safety improvement appears to be gaining 
momentum.  However these models have only recently been implemented or are still in 
development stages and there is currently little evidence regarding the outcomes of this approach 
(refer Section 7.9).  While some conditions, such as those on ‘never lists’, can definitely be 
determined to be a complication of the patient’s care, the categorising of many other conditions as 
‘hospital acquired’ can be difficult (Fuller et al., 2011).  Therefore, the complexities of classifying 
conditions as ‘hospital acquired’ is a significant consideration of a model that penalises for hospital 
acquired conditions. 
 
Information on performance (including casemix data) can be used to drive quality and safety.  
Sutherland et al. (2011) report that some empirical work in Australia by Sharma, (2007) suggests 
ABF may encourage hospitals to provide higher quality of care to reduce costly complications or 
readmissions.  Implementation of ABF has also been associated with increased efforts to monitor 
hospital quality (Duckett, 1995; Ettelt et al., 2006) and the clinical and administrative data used to 
support ABF are being used for hospital quality improvement initiatives (McNair et al., 2009; 
Iezzoni 2009; Hagen et al., 2006).   
 
An examination of the effects of the introduction of Activity Based Funding indicates there has 
been no reduction in hospital quality of care associated with ABF implementation (Sutherland, 
2011).  The incentives under ABF are for hospitals to decrease lengths of stay, increase volume 
and reduce cost but it is important that these gains are not made at the cost of a reduction in 
quality of care (Sutherland, 2011).  There is little evidence for a decline in the quality or safety of 
care associated with the introduction of ABF with studies indicating mortality remains much the 
same or is slightly lower (Forgione et al., 2005; Louis et al., 1999; Moreno-Serra and Wagstaff, 
2009), readmission rates remain similar and hospital quality indicators have shown no decline 
(Farrar et al., 2009; Jencks et al., 2009; Kahn et al., 1990; Kahn et al., 1993).   
 
However, overall, it is noted that much of the current research literature reviewed reflects poor 
research designs with inadequate controls making attribution of the effects uncertain.  The 
conclusion is that there is insufficient international evidence at present to support the ‘off the shelf’ 
adoption of any existing pricing model that incorporates financial incentives and/or sanctions for 
quality and safety.   
 
There are several important conclusions which cut across those models that have been carefully 
evaluated.  The first is that the incentives must be of sufficient size to generate a change in 
behaviour and practice (Jha et al., 2012).  Those models which have involved only very small 
amounts or percentages of money have not been demonstrated to be effective.  This is the case 
regardless of other details of the model. 
 
The second is that funding incentives need to get down to the level of the clinical department if 
they are to have any effect (Glasziou et al., 2012; Jha et al., 2012; Ryan, 2009; Sutton et al., 2011; 
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2012; Stockwell, 2010).  If the intention of the model is to create incentives to improve the quality 
and/or safety of clinical care, the clinical department that delivers that care needs to be 
incentivised.  Models that focus funding incentives at the hospital or regional health authority level 
only have largely not been demonstrated to improve clinical care. 
 
The third is the scope and comprehensiveness of the model.  In relation to scope, most models 
reported in the literature focus on inpatient care and there is little focus in the literature on 
outpatients, emergency department or hospital outreach care.2  Within inpatient care, most models 
focus on medicine and elective surgery and there is very little in the literature on other clinical 
areas such as non-elective surgery, paediatrics, obstetrics, palliative care and rehabilitation.  Very 
few models are hospital-wide and comprehensive (refer Sections 4.5 and 5.7).   
 
These conclusions have important implications in the Australian context.  The Independent 
Hospital Pricing Authority (IHPA) is determining the price that the Commonwealth pays Local 
Health Networks for the Commonwealth contribution to public hospital funding.  The 
Commonwealth contribution is approximately 40% of public hospital funding and any incentive that 
the IHPA might build into the model would impact only on the Commonwealth contribution.   
 
Further, the Commonwealth funding is directed to Local Health Networks (regional health 
authorities) rather than to specific hospitals or to clinical departments within hospitals.  Based on 
the evidence in the international literature (Glasziou et al., 2012; Jha et al., 2012; Ryan, 2009; 
Sutton et al., 2011;2012; Stockwell, 2010), it is unlikely that incentives built into the model at this 
level would work unless there was agreement for these incentives to flow down to the level of the 
clinical department. 
 
Finally, the focus on traditional hospital activity (largely inpatient medicine and surgery) in P4P 
models has important implications in relation to allocative efficiency and in terms of incentives to 
develop new models of care.  ‘Best practice’ and ‘normative’ pricing models are better than P4P in 
creating incentives for new models of care but, like P4P, most reported models are currently 
narrow in scope (refer Sections 4.5 and 5.7).  
 
Accordingly it is important that Australia learns the lessons of the international experience in 
considering how to progress this issue in the future. In doing so, it is important that Australia take 
into account key recommendations from the literature including (but not limited to) the following: 
 
1. The impact of any proposed approach needs to be modelled and carefully evaluated both prior 
to implementation and at regular intervals during the intervention.  
Many models reported in the literature have not been carefully evaluated.  Others have been 
implemented without any evaluation built in from the onset.  Instead, evaluation has occurred 
several years after implementation which has made it almost impossible to determine 
attribution. 
2. Potential perverse incentives need to be carefully considered.  The two most common 
perverse incentives in the literature are incentives to select the easiest patients and not those 
with the greatest needs (‘cream skimming’) and incentives to change what hospitals report 
rather than what they do (e.g., to not report adverse events) (Glasziou et al., 2012; Appleby et 
al., 2012; Sutherland et al., 2011). 
3. In order to address the incentive to ‘cream skim’, there is a need for patient risk-adjustment to 
be incorporated.  This requires the development of appropriate patient risk-adjustment 
methodologies, which are still in an embryonic stage of development (Sutherland, 2012; 
Birkmeyer and Birkmeyer 2006; Ryan, 2009;.Ryan et al., 2012) 
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Appendix 1: Search Strategy  







• Science Direct 
All searching was limited to the years 2000-current.  The search was separated into the four areas 
of pricing: 
 
1. Best practice  
2. Normative 
3. Accreditation / Structural 
4. Quality / Pay for performance 
Combinations of search terms used for each area of pricing were as followed: 
1. Best practice  
“best practice” , pricing, hospital, incentive, cost*, “evidence based”, funding, health care 
2. Accreditation / structural 
Accredit*, funding, hospital, structural, benchmark*, pricing, health care 
3. Normative 
Normative, pricing, hospital, funding, incentive, health care 
4. Quality / Pay for performance 
“Efficient pricing”, “pay for performance”, “activity based funding”, quality, hospital, pricing, 
incentive, health care, funding, patient outcome 
 
Search sets Databases Dates Hits Downloads 
Accreditation, structural pricing Medline, Cinahl, EconLit 2000+ 503 15 
Accreditation, structural pricing Scopus 2000+ 91 9 
Accreditation, structural pricing PsychINFO 2000+ 28 0 
Best practice, ABF, pricing Medline, Cinahl, EconLit 2000+ 401 29 
Best practice, ABF, pricing Scopus 2000+ 88 11 
Best practice, ABF, pricing PsychINFO 2000+ 33 0 
Normative pricing Medline, Cinahl, EconLit 2000+ 157 23 
Normative Scopus 2000+ 4 0 
Pay for performance Medline, Cinahl, EconLit 2000+ 506 66 
Quality pricing Medline, Cinahl, EconLit 2000+ 194 31 
Quality, pay for performance Scopus 2000+ 44 14 
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Appendix 2: Listing of Hospital Acquired Conditions 
 
 
NHS PbR UK 
 
Never events: ‘serious, largely preventable patient safety incidents that should not occur if the available 
preventative measures have been implemented by healthcare providers’ 
Must fulfill the following criteria;  
The incident has clear potential for or has caused severe harm/death.  
• There is evidence of occurrence in the past (i.e. it is a known source of risk).  
• There is existing national guidance and/or national safety recommendations on how the event can be 
prevented and support for implementation.  
• The event is largely preventable if the guidance is implemented.  
• Occurrence can be easily defined, identified and continually measured.  
 
Financial penalty: Paid at the discretion of the Commissioners 
 
Never events for 2011/2012: 
 
Surgical 
1. Wrong site surgery 
2. Wrong implant/prosthesis 
3. Retained foreign object post-operation 
 
Medication events 
4. Wrongly prepared high-risk injectable medication 
5. Maladministration of potassium-containing solutions 
6. Wrong route administration of chemotherapy 
7. Wrong route administration of oral/enteral treatment 
8. Intravenous administration of epidural medication 
9. Maladministration of Insulin 
10. Overdose of midazolam during conscious sedation 
11. Opioid overdose of an opioid-naïve patient 
12. Inappropriate administration of daily oral methotrexate 
 
Mental Health 
13. Suicide using non-collapsible rails 
14. Escape of a transferred prisoner 
 
General Healthcare 
15. Falls from unrestricted windows 
16. Entrapment in bedrails 
17. Transfusion of ABO-incompatible blood components 
18. Transplantation of ABO or HLA-incompatible organs 
19. Misplaced naso- or oro-gastric tubes 
20. Wrong gas administered 
21. Failure to monitor and respond to oxygen saturation 
22. Air embolism 
23. Misidentification of patients 
24. Severe scalding of patients 
 
Maternity 
25. Maternal death due to post partum haemorrhage after elective caesarean section 
 




Never events: Serious, largely preventable patient safety incidents that should not occur if the available 
preventative measures have been implemented. 
 
Financial penalty: No payments will be made for these events or any related follow up work 
Never events in 2012-2013: 
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• Death or likely permanent harm as a result of bed rail entrapment or entrapment in other 
bed accessories, 
• Infants discharged to the wrong family, 
• Death or neurological damage as a result of Intravascular gas embolism, 
• Procedures involving the retention of instruments or other material after surgery, and 
• Procedures involving the wrong patient or body part resulting in death or major permanent 
loss of function. 
 
Adverse Events 
• Hospital acquired bloodstream infection ($10k reduction) and/or a  
• Stage 3 or 4 pressure injury ($30k or $50k reduction respectively).  
 




Hospital Acquired Conditions (HACs): Could reasonably have been prevented through the application of 
evidence-based guidelines. 
 
Financial penalty: Hospitals do not receive additional payment for cases in which one of the selected (HAC) 
conditions was not present on admission. That is, the case is paid as though the secondary diagnosis were not 
present. 
 
HACs for 2013: 
 
• Foreign Object Retained After Surgery  
• Air Embolism 
• Blood Incompatibility 
• Pressure Ulcer Stages III & IV 
• Falls and Trauma: Fracture, Disclocation, Intracranial Injury, Crushing Injury, Burn, Other Injuries 
• Catheter-Associated Urinary Tract Infection (UTI) 
• Vascular Catheter-Associated Infection 
• Manifestations of Poor Glycemic Control 
• Surgical Site Infection, Mediastinitis, following Coronary Artery Bypass Graft) 
• Surgical Site Infection Following Certain Orthopedic Procedures 
• Surgical Site Infection Following Bariatric Surgery for Obesity 
• Surgical Site Infection Following Cardiac Implantable Electronic Device (CIED) 
• Deep Vein Thrombosis and Pulmonary Embolism Following Certain Orthopedic Procedures 
• Iatrogenic Pneumothorax with Venous Catheterization 
 
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
